Defining Social Democracy
Social democracy in its present form is the result of over hundred and
fifty years of evolution, and breaks from its Marxist origins. Its ties to
Marxism were broken after the October Revolution in 1917 in Russia because
socialists disagreed on the means to reach socialism. There were those who
sided with the revolutionary socialists in the ilk of the October Revolution,
and there were those who preferred the democratic means to achieve similar
goals. After this split, the former began to call themselves ‘communist’
whereas the latter became known as ‘democratic socialists’. This further
evolved to become social democracy, as we know today (Andrew Heywood, and
Bruno Coppieters and Kris Deschouwer). Andrew Heywood states that ‘The social
democratic tradition has therefore come to stand for a broad balance between
the market economy on the one hand, and state intervention on the other.’ Although this is a theoretical development of social democracy, I seek
to work with the definition of social democracy, advocated by Bruno Coppieters and Kris Deschouwer, in
its practice as a social movement, an ideology and a type of society. I will
focus specifically on the first two criteria.
The social movement is the unity of the wider, organised working class
in political parties and trade unions. As a process it has its origins in the
emergence of social cleavages as a result of the industrial revolution, and has
developed and become institutionalised over the course of a hundred and fifty
years advancing its causes slowly. However, this did not occur in the East.
Reform was rapid and cleavages were blurry - hampered by other divisions, such
as ethnicity, so as to weaken the movement. Ideologically, social democracy
advocated a classless society like the communists, but this then altered after
World War II to advocate an expansion of the welfare state within a liberal
capitalist framework. Yet in the East, ‘socialism’ became discredited even when
the ideological content was capitalist and populist. The transition saw a clash
of principles where marketisation and economic liberalism rolled back the role
of the state, especially in social welfare.
So social democracy developed into two different concepts between East
and West based on its experiences of development, although they both face
similar challenges today. These two defining features of social democracy will enable
me to address its current form in Macedonia. Primarily, the point here is that
one cannot directly or fairly compare the nature of social democracy in the
East with that of the West.
The Socialist International experienced this problem of definition after
the collapse of communism, when admitting members to the social democratic
family. This is because the fluidity of the transition hasn’t harboured an
environment to make lasting decisions, the concept of ‘left’ is defined
differently in the East in ideological/policy terms, the differences between
new and successor social democrats within a state make a decision difficult as
to the trajectory of the party in the future, as well as a general inability by
the populations to differentiate between revolutionary and democratic
socialism. Hence a decision upon successor parties is based on the way they
have structurally changed. This is evident in who these parties appeal to for
support, the composition of their membership, and an experience of internal ideological
splits due to democratisation. But the effects of these could lead to
nationalist tendencies, the emergence of a small social democratic group within
the parties led by individuals who are younger, and a pull to a strong party
centre to maintain unity. However one observation by Heinz Timmerman is that
successor parties retained a conservative approach to the economy during
transition, albeit this may have altered since. Therefore, ‘social democratisation’
as a process of change within the successor parties can allow me to judge how
far along this process the SDUM is at present.
Communist Successor Parties and their Legacies
Building on this issue of communist successor parties, as it is highly
relevant given the SDUMs heritage, I look to arguments developed in Bozoki and
Ishiyama’s ‘The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe’. In
their opening chapter, they look at the transformation of political identities
that these parties undertook during democratisation through the strategies they
employed. The typology of four party positions comes from whether the party is
still Marxist or not, and whether it is transmuted or not. Factors that impact
on the strategy that is followed are either environmental or internal organisational.
The former rests on the reaction a party has to certain stimuli such as
election results or vying to dominate political space on the left from similar
contenders. The latter, on the other hand, depends on whether the party is a
mass or cadre party (as to whom can change its identity), the attitude of the
former regime whilst in power, and events during the transition including the
carry over of party personnel and internal ideological struggles. Therefore, Bozoki and Ishiyama write, ‘the evolution of the adaptation strategies of the successor parties can
be seen as both the product of the interaction between political performance on
the one hand and the internal organizational characteristics of the successor
parties, on the other.’ These points will allow me to re-evaluate the party
within the typology outlined to assess its current strategy.
Yet, it
is the existence of legacies which allow me to return to the period prior to
independence because ‘If epistemological
criteria for causal explanation require a minimum of temporal causal depth,
only institutions, structures, processes, and actions that antedate the
“proximate” events of the transition qualify as the ultimate causal variables
of regime change.’ (Herbert Kitschelt) Yet these legacies do not overcome exogenous
‘shocks’ and internal party maneuverings of ambitious politicians.
Understanding the impact of legacies, in their variety, upon the party today
helps to assess the extent to which the SDUM are hostages to their legacies, if
at all. Kitschelt’s typology of predicting the strategies and organisations of
communist successor parties starts his causal chain from the era around World
War I. The variables include: the strength of precommunist political society,
the professionalization of the state apparatus, whether it was a newly
independent country seeking Western support, if the party strategy was
programmatic or clientelistic, its ideological clarity, its electoral support,
the ratio of members to voters and citizens, as well as the extent of internal party
centralization. He describes Macedonia’s typology as ‘paternal communism’, a
group marked different because of their association with independence
movements.
The
impact of legacies on the strategies of the Macedonian successor party show
that because they emerged from dominant ethnic rulers, the regional leaders
turned to independence, democratisation and reform. Because of weak
precommunist political society and a weak state apparatus there was no mobilisation
in opposition to communism, and the party was partial to promote clientelistic
practices. This may have stymied the ideological renewal of the party. Yet a
consociational form of governance possibly cut across these legacies because of
internal ethnic divisions, external threats and international instability.
Those in
the three-tiered hierarchy of the party may have felt the impact of legacies in
the organization of the Macedonian successor party. The leaders (first tier) in
newly independent states could expect support for politico-economic reform. The
middle ranking bureaucracy (second tier) could lose out, so some may leave
parties governed by reformists, as was the case in Macedonia. The members’
(third tier) incentives to remain would be reduced, but sentimental and
clientelistic factors play a role in their staying. The parties in newly independent states may
lose members who lose out to reform and clientelist links, but nationalist-minded
supporters will join. This was a consistency in membership during transition.
The distribution of power within the organisation is also impacted by legacies
because differences in political outlooks of the three tiers of the party may
increase or decrease internal democracy. In Macedonia, centralisation has
occurred, but wholesale purging of the old guard was avoided by a new
membership intake. The link to trade unions is tenuous as they tended to be
present in those industries that would lose out from reform, and thus proved
problematic to parties who pursued economic liberalization such as Macedonia. But
to what extent is this typology assigned to the Macedonian case still relevant
today?
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