Social Democracy in Macedonia (4/5)

Having previously analysed social democracy in generic terms, the focus now turns to the nature of social democracy in Macedonia. Specifically focusing on the SDUM, I will look at its development from independence to 2012 through the prisms of legacies of nationalism, democratization and communism.

The SDUM – An Overview

The SDUM was founded in 1991 being the successor party to the League of Communists of Macedonia (LCM), and is an observer member to the Socialist International and associate member of the Party of European Socialists. Kiro Gligorov became the first President of Macedonia elected by democratic means in 1991 and held that position until 1999. At the time of writing, the President of the party was Branko Crvenkovski, who was the President of Macedonia from 2004 to 2009, held the position of Prime Minister from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2002 to 2004. One notable President of the SDUM recently was Radmila Sekerinska who held the position from 2006 to 2008 and led the party into the 2008 parliamentary elections. In 2012 the SDUM had twenty nine MPs of the Sobranie out of one hundred and twenty three, and all but three were of Macedonian ethnicity with two Vlach and one Serb. Eleven MPs were female and the age range was from twenty nine to fifty seven, with an average age of forty two. The party’s electoral support at the 2011 parliamentary elections was to be found in Skopje, the south, south west and parts of the north east of the country, and can be observed as poor in Albanian areas along with the support of the VMRO-DPMNE. However, during election time broad based electoral pacts, with the SDUM as the core, contest these elections. The executive board of the SDUM, which is elected by a central board of the SDUM that is elected at the congress of the party, is comprised of twenty three people, including six MPs.

Although the party came second in the first democratic elections in 1990, they gained power in 1992 following a ‘government of experts’ and when VMRO-DPMNE failed to garner support for a government. Crvenkovski invited Albanian party members to form part of his government. This initiated the informal establishment of a consociational model of democracy. Economic liberalization, the move to a ‘Euro-Atlantic’ direction, the easing of ethnic relations, as well as feeling the impact of a UN embargo on Serbia and an economic blockade by Greece, all occurred during this period. Although they won the 1994 elections, this was in fact a result of VMRO-DPMNE not contesting the second round of voting, even if some suggested that it was a sign that being a socialist or from the old guard was not a stigma. Defeat in 1998 was attributed to the perception of economic corruption during privatization. However, the acceptance of this defeat along with the Presidential election a year later was seen as a litmus test for the democratic idea to accept losing as elections. The party’s re-election in 2002 came after the 2001 ethnic conflict and the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, which it embarked on implementing.

Throughout this period, the party’s relationship with nationalist rhetoric and actions was fluid. Given its heritage, it is seen as the party that created the state of Macedonia and the Macedonian nation, and that it led the charge for independence during the collapse of communism, partially fulfilling the goal of nationalism in Gellner’s sense. But debates over identity and primordial links continued and are present even today. Debates over the constitution, decisions on the use of symbols and languages by minorities, relations with neighbours especially around the name issue, and the recent ‘Skopje 2014’ project in the capital, saw the SDUM develop its stance, which were in opposition to the line carried by VMRO-DPMNE. However, the nationalist rhetoric had moved somewhat from ethnic particularity to a more state-orientated patriotism. Some believed that this had simply bolstered the ethnic divide in the country and reified the mono-ethnicity of the party.

Internal party democracy and the relationship between the leaders, party organs and membership altered since independence. The side effect of having a less disciplined body, encouraging discussion and dissent, and some lack of acceptance of defeat, is that internal ideological splits became actual party splits; most notable was the departure of Presidential candidate Tito Petkovski in 2005 to form the New Social Democratic Party. This overview of the SDUM provided the contextual background for my fieldwork in 2012.

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My visit to Skopje spanned 6 days during the end of August 2012. My contact was the Programme Manager at the Progres Institut for Social Democracy (Progres) who was also a teaching and research assistant at the Faculty of Law in the city, whom I have worked with previously. Along with interviewing him, he organized interviews with people in the following positions; a Project Manager at Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Macedonia (FES); an executive board member of the SDUM and economic policy adviser (Economic Adviser); an executive board member of the SDUM (Exec Member); the President of the SDYM (President of SDYM); and the International Secretary of the SDYM (International SDYM).

I also approached the Macedonia Project Manager of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy/Macedonian Centre for Parliamentary Studies (WFD) and the International Officer at the British Labour Party (Labour) in a personal capacity to provide further external observations in their work with the SDUM. These meetings were semi constructed in order for the interviewee to express more fully their opinions and observations. Notes of the interviews were taken, but not transcribed word for word. I will refer to them by the shorthand word that has followed their position titles in brackets above.

Social Democracy Movement

Upon my beginning the interviews I asked for general comments on the current state of the wider social democratic movement in Macedonia. Every person, apart from the Economic Adviser who wasn’t asked, responded by saying it was weak. The International SDYM person and Progres person both said that the SDUM party was essentially the movement. An explanation put forward by the Executive Member was that the transition period resulted in many losers because of the privatization policies that were enacted. On the other hand, the FES person looked to the political climate at the time as nurturing fear and repression for such a movement to have expressed itself. When asked about the roles of the trade unions in the wider movement, all the interviewees observed no link. The Executive Member believed that this was due to them being the losers during marketization, and the WFD person believed them to be weak during privatization so they ultimately could not resist such reforms. However, at the time, the Executive Member suggested that they were bureaucratized and did not support workers. Instead they worked with whoever was in government, and at the time that was the VMRO-DPMNE, sentiments which the Economic Adviser and WFD person agreed with. A link to the SDUM would only come when they returned to power. The Progres person highlighted the formal connections with the Trade Unions that Progres had, but he too acknowledged their function as an instrument of the government. This was the same opinion expressed by the International SDYM person in relation to the Students Union and student movement. Therefore the movement split because the trade unions were weak when the party asserted its renewed ideology during (and because of) the transition. A positive note was that Progres was the first official nongovernmental organization (NGO) set up that advocated political values and traditions, and could be seen as a satellite of the social democracy movement. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy were other NGOs that provided resources to engage with these groups also; the former to develop social democracy, the latter to develop civil society.

The relationship to civil society should be mentioned here, as it links to social movements that could potentially have been part of a wider social democracy movement. The Executive Member and WFD person saw the links with civil society as weak. This is the view the Labour person expressed and believed needed addressing. However, the International SDYM person believed that the movement in itself was weak. They organized on a small scale, but if it failed they would turn to the SDUM for organisational help. There was a crossover of individuals in civil society and the SDUM, but the civil society groups did not want a political association. As the International SDYM person described, when she went to engage with the very NGOs she worked amongst prior to holding a SDYM position, she was jeered because of this political association. The perception here, as the WFD person saw it, was one of a double-edged sword. They wanted support, but ultimately they wanted their issue dealt with so they could forgo building supportive capacity to hopefully catch the ear of the government at the time. Whilst I was visiting, a protest regarding the high prices for utility bills was conducted. There was no party political presence from the SDUM, yet the next day’s news saw the government link the protest to the machinations of the SDUM. According to the Progres person, the government would also do this to organizations that had foreign funding and claim them to be anti-national. Progres and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung were also trying to build these links with the work that they undertook.

Social Democratic Ideology and ‘Social Democratization’

The anchor of social democratic ideology is in the economy. This view was expressed by the Economic Adviser and was seen as a priority of the party under the government of the day. He linked economic inefficiency to the politicization of state institutions. The impact of privatization was felt badly, but the party had to carry out this process, and so it became motivated to develop reforms for the people. Given that social democracy is built upon the assumption that there will be economic growth to invest in core state functions, the response to a recession is crucial. He articulated that this was a possibility in 2012, however the SDUM had located €300-400 million in efficiency savings within the state institutions should they be reformed. He mentioned that there were cases where people were paid, but no work was done. The 30% unemployment rate meant that austerity wasn’t an answer, but job creation was. An example was the building of the statues for ‘Skopje 2014’. It cost €200 million, whereas the state budget for wages in the public sector per year was €360 million, so money could be better spent. He believed that there were not enough experts on the economy so that policies could have been fully developed. Therefore, at that moment the economy and specifically unemployment was seen as the priority of the SDUM. Even pursuing non-ideological policies, such as pushing the government to pay off its debt to private companies was needed because it would retain jobs for people.

Yet, the FES person believed that even if the impact of privatization was negative, the SDUM would claim it as their success. Her observation was that during the transition the SDUM were advocating policies that were the opposite of their ideology. In 2012, the VMRO-DPMNE was enacting ‘social democratic’ measures such as an increase in pensions. So there was a sense of ideological ‘cross-dressing’. So the SDUM needed to overcome this perception. The Executive Member explained this ideological incoherence projected by the party as a result of the transition to democracy and the appeal of Euro-Atlantic integration, which limited the extent to which an ideological and programmatic approach could have been developed. But in 2012 the SDUM had ideological markers to distinguish itself from the VMRO-DPMNE. He suggested that these ideological markers were starting to transcend ethnicity, although this was a long way off from completion.

Ideologically, the Executive Member observed two currents in the party. One was progressive, liberal, and stood for individual rights and was seen in the elite-end of the party. The other was more in tune with the members and electorate and was ‘socially and economically conservative’ and more nationalistic. The Economic Adviser observed this split in the approach to the economy between pro-business and pro-worker/for the unemployed. A split emerged in 2008, and a proportion of the middle ranking strata of the party went with it. The FES person saw the splits less in terms of ideology and more in terms of leaders and the positions they could offer to followers. However, The International SDYM person didn’t observe an ideological split within the SDYM but acknowledged the strength of charismatic leadership as exhibited by Crvenkovski. This could be an indication of the SDYMs freedom from legacies and their more progressive outlook vis-à-vis the main party. The FES and Labour people both acknowledged this strength of leadership. The Progres person also believed that the party in the decade before 2012 had become more progressive and moved from the neo-liberal approach to the economy, but was still changing. He pointed to Radmila Sekerinska as embodying this progressive approach by inviting different external ideas into the party for debate, which the Labour person agreed with.

The Economic Adviser believed that the process of social democratization was ongoing, The Executive Member and the Progres person saw it as becoming more aware and concerned for socially marginalized groups such as the gay community; whereas the President of SDYM believed that the party had changed significantly in membership and attitudes. However, the FES person observed a general weakness in progressive thinking. Progres had been active in promoting ‘social democratization’ by helping to establish the SDUMs value statement in 2009 (along with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), opening up to civil movements and pushing policies for social inclusion of socially marginalized groups. A close working relationship was evident between Progress and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. The FES person mentioned that the NGO had facilitated debates on social democracy and sent a Macedonian representative to a discussion on social democracy in Europe but the ideas never filtered down. The Labour Party didn’t direct the SDUMs political programme but simply highlighted the mechanisms it uses when developing its own. However, if they didn’t like where the SDUM were going it would review its links with it in line with SI and PES principles and membership guidelines.

Even looking outside of the SDUM, the WFD person didn’t observe social democratic ideology in the Albanian parties. This was a sign of the obstacles to building a non-ethnic ideological movement, and he didn’t believe that a solution was achievable because ethnic identity was so contrasting and divisive.

Party Organization and Leadership

The Executive Member outlined the structure of the party as having seventy seven functioning municipal branches, with those in the East and West either not operating or functioned for symbolic reasons. The party congress held every four years elected a central board, which then elected an executive board, and in turn elected the President and Vice Presidents. According to the International SDYM person, this was the same for the SDYM. The Executive Member explained that authority lay with the President and the executive board, whose decisions were ratified by the central board. No decisions had been struck down in the three years he had been a member. During elections, a Central Electoral Headquarters runs the campaigns centrally and transmits objectives to the six regional offices that in turn communicate these to the branches. Membership fees, donations and the state finance the party, with the latter reimbursing the party after an election depending on how many votes they got. The Economic Adviser, Progres person, FES person and Labour person all spoke of the topical changes, led by Sekerinska, which included the setting up of policy councils. This was one aspect of the ‘social democratization’ of the party internally. However the Economic Adviser said that party members were not interested and attempts were made to approach them, but the process needed to be improved. A sense of value, beyond improving their socio-economic lot, was what was needed for this to have happened. He did accept that it was a great way to receive input from academics and businesses into their policy processes. The FES person saw the difference in the approach Crvenkovski was taking at the time as a strong leader, in that going into villages and speaking to voters was altering the party’s image. She believed, along with the WFD person, that the SDUM were seen as an elitist party, whereas the VMRO-DPMNE were seen as closer to the people.

Internal party democracy was somewhat still in its formation. Instead of direct elections, a dialogue between members and the leadership occurred. For the Mayoral candidate selections, the Executive Member explained that the local branch selects four candidates, which the headquarters then choose one. This was based on a combination of the best person and the one least likely to cause division. He explained this as a by-product of a lack of understanding in democracy to losing as the reason for this mechanism. There was a one in three quota for the minority gender to be selected for elections, and there was a one in five quota for SDYM members. However this was seen as a stepping-stone and a place to be noticed for the future. There was no ethnic minority quota, as evidenced in the unrepresentative make up of SDUM parliamentarians at the time, but he explained that it was a mutual understanding that in mixed areas, candidates would be picked to match the community, especially for local government elections. The same quotas existed in the SDYM according to the President of the SDYM, but he mentioned the informal way of decision-making and influencing was by talking to the President or Secretary direct. The Progres, FES and WFD people all observed that party democracy was lacking and that this deafened any debate or criticism because member’s rights were not protected to do so. It would be a slow change but Progres and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung were working towards this goal. The WFD person hinted that party democracy was probably stronger when it was the League of Communist of Macedonia, as splits weren’t feared.

Having noted earlier of the overlap of people who were MPs and on the party executive board, this was also practiced by Progres. The Progres person noted that some held positions in the party and that at that point in time it was crucial so that they could influence the party internally. He suggested that in the future Progres could be more independent, but it depended on the progress of ideologies, a stable political system and if ideology overcomes ethnicity.

Consociational Democracy and Political Culture

The electoral and party systems work in dialogue. The consociational model of democracy, that results from these mechanisms of democracy that have been utilized, reaffirms national identity and ethnic difference. All interviewees whose opinion I asked of this agreed, both internal and external observers. The FES person believed that it also meant that these parties only mixed with their own people and didn’t communicate. The pre-election pact agreed in 2012 between the SDUM and DPA meant that a deal on where to place candidates would be made, according to the WFD person, and this limited the choice to ethnic parties. Some were pessimistic in their hopes for the future. The Executive Member saw the need in accepting the differences before co-operation could occur. But peace and security of the state took precedence, and acts of ethnic violence would cause instability. The President of SDYM believed it was hard to move to ethnic integration despite the form of governance, using the recent episode of the Albanian Defense Minister laying a wreath on the graves of the Albanian guerillas of the 2001 conflict with uniformed army personnel to highlight this tension. Also, electorally speaking, the Executive Member said that even if the parties sought to gain support from outside of their ethnic groups, they would be classed as traitors. Yet, the President of SDYM explained that the party did select candidates in mixed areas for the purpose of gaining ethnic votes, but only for local elections. The Labour person believed that the Albanian parties should move beyond ethnic rights and towards developing a different message, which the FES person said had only just begun.

Everyone apart from the Progres and Labour people and the Presdient of SDYM observed clientelism in the political culture of the country; and that it was expressed within the party structure, between the party in power and those in state positions, and between the state and civil society as mentioned earlier. The politicization of institutions acted as a function of the government to retain power. It also acted as a break on criticism being levied on the government by civil society through fear, according to the FES person, and by withholding state funding, according to the WFD person. What was lacking in the political culture was the acceptance of democratic norms, such as the recognition of losing so as not to act out of proportion, as explained by the Progres person. The FES person also believed that there was no political responsibility and accountability, and that politicians were not punished for wrongdoing. Even party politics was brushed aside to topple a government, as seen by the SDUM and DPA agreeing to this aim in 2012. The impression from all the interviewees was that ethnic cleavages were embedded, and even institutionalized, and thus would be hard to move to a more ideological party politics.

Legacies of Communism, Nation-building and the ‘Transition’

Legacies play an important role in how a party is constituted, and the SDUM was no exception. Ideologically, The President of SDYM said the party sought at first to distance itself from its communist past, but in recent years this had been seen as a positive connection, and some are even nostalgic according to the FES person. Electorally, distance was needed at first according to the Executive Member. Politically, he noted the unity of ethnic groups in the League of Communist of Macedonia with these networks remaining when ethnic parties emerged.

He also believed the SDUM saw itself as the party that built the state in 1945, so this legacy led to a belief in the priority of protecting the state. The SDUM also had people in positions in public groups thanks to the funding of these during the former regime thanks to the League of Communists of Macedonia. However the legacy of a strong organisation did not extend to the rural areas, where the League wasn’t as entrenched as in the urban areas, so it could not capitalize on this as much. The WFD person believed there to be individuals who were League members still in the SDUM, but the Executive Member said it was hard to gauge the number of members who were in the League, but he did have people who would say to him that they have been members for 50 years. The FES person observed a positive link through joint working between the social democrats of the former Yugoslav countries, which enabled them to share relevant best practice because of their shared experiences.

An ambivalent legacy had been privatization. The Executive Member, Economic Adviser and the WFD person all said that these reforms harmed the image of the party at the time, especially because of the emergence of an economic elite; but The FES person believed that the SDUM would claim credit for the changes even if the elite were still present. During this period, the party led the independence movement so it had a legacy of nationalism, but in 2012 it was moving to patriotic rhetoric, according to the Executive Member. The International SDYM person noted that SDYM relations with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement were sour because of the re-emergence of national historical issues including the name issue, but they were respectful to the recent imaginings of Macedonian history in ‘Skopje 2014’, even if they weren’t personally linked to those debates because of their youth.

National Identity and Ethnicity

To add to the previously mentioned presence of national identity and ethnicity in the processes and structures mentioned, the response to nationalist posturing by the government was an example of the SDUM displaying their approach. On ‘Skopje 2014’, the Executive Member said that they could not attack its national aspect, but to provide a socio-economic argument as to where the money could have been better spent, or to say that the ethnic tensions that could arise did not justify it, as the Progres person also believed.

Economically speaking, the Economic Adviser recognized the need to tackle poverty, either targeted to those worse off or more generally. He said that in the Albanian areas there was an economy, just not an official one that has a relationship with the state; so official figures of unemployment showed it higher in these areas. However, the SDUMs concern was with workers rights and protection, so it didn’t always involve an ethnic angle that needed to be appeased. He also believed that people understood that trade needed to occur between those states it had identity issues with, and that a functioning Greek economy was better for Macedonia. However, Greece wanted the name dispute to continue for its own internal political mobilization. 

And as such, these were there results of my interviews in Skopje in 2012.