My Images of SEE – 14:17, Mon 8th August

So, this morning my alarm didn’t wake us up at our scheduled time of 08:00. It was my intent to leave early to get to ‘Simeondis’ travel agents for 09:00. However, we slowly crept from our sleep to get ready for going out. Liam was frozen all night, him sleeping under the air-con and all, meant he had a disturbed sleep. I, on the other hand, stirred only once. We departed our hotel at 09:25 and headed west towards Democracy Square. We then turned off down 26^th October Street. I expected the shop to be at the bottom of this street – a good mile away. However the Law Courts, as indicated in my e-mail instructions, appeared to our left. So we crossed over and located our building. A porter indicated, using sign language, the first floor. So we went up. On the door there was a sign – in Greek. It said ‘Simeondis’ on it, but there was no answer. We tried opening it but no luck. Reading a number (and a vague similarity to numbers, a second ‘numeral’ we assumed it opened at 10:00, so we departed. To kill time, we discovered the old city wall. So we walked around the back (behind the Law Courts) via a small park, back to our original destination. The walls were a good 3000 yards from the sea, beating my assumption that they went all the way to the waters edge.

Once 10:00 had been reached, we moved in once more. Again the door remained unanswered and locked. Liam suggested we go up a floor, which we did. Lo and behold, there was the office. I produced my e-mail to the girl on the front desk. She opened her book and saw my name. I noticed it was at the top of the list for the bus that day – talk about forward planning! She took our passports, and gave us a stamped ticket and our passports. We paid €20 each for the one-way coach. It was to depart tomorrow at 17:30 opposite our building.

We then walked back to our hotel room. We rehydrated and applied sun cream before departing again – handing in our room key to the friendly reception man. Liam noticed a fort of the hill yesterday, so we decided to hike it there. So we stuck to a northeasterly route up the hill. We passed a massive open space, in front of what looked like a municipal building, which contained what one could only presume to be Roman/Greek ruins. They were spectacular, especially against the overbearing buildings around us. We then continued.

Above one of the next east/west roads we appeared to be in more residential surroundings. There were still slim and windy streets but the gradient was getting steeper. The housing must have been built mostly in the 1950s or 1970s – depending on the block. All had small balconies and over them had screens for shade. Cars were almost always parked chaotically on the road, especially at junctions. We pressed on.

Only for the local bus going past, to indicate some sense of familiarity in somewhat unfamiliar surroundings, we were best able to predict that we were on the right track. So we pushed on. We then got to a point where a house wasn't built in-between the sandwiched buildings.

The views were superb. It reminded me of images I have seen of Jerusalem – only with a bay; the crisp, turquoise sea glistening in the midday sun. Facing south, we could see east to where the airport was, scanning the bay – with its smattering of sea vessels – across to the tip of the port in the west. To our left was the old city wall, crawling past us, up the hill, to our destination. The Fort.

So we continued on for the last leg of the journey. Once we reached the ‘summit’ we realized it was closed. But I did get the opportunity to buy postcards and fridge magnets. We then went to the door of the tower, which had a decked area. The views were stunning. Now you could see the entire port too. 

 

Directly ahead of us, looking south was the wall striding towards the Rotunda. We could see the small, spiky tower next to the Archaeological Museum we visited yesterday, and the vastness of the Thermaikos Gulf before us. We then retreated back to the town, following the wall south, capturing a glimpse of the Rotunda close up as we went past. 

Its brick was almost sandstone like. Its accompanying tower must have been a later addition. We retraced out steps westwards down Egnatia in search of food. We intended on going ‘local’ out of a street side fast food outlet, but were put off by there being no English to help us make an informed culinary choice. So we walked down the ‘Bond Street’ of Thess, Tsimiski, and back to Aristotle Square. Here we ate at a different establishment, but still soaking up the daytime atmosphere.

Liam then wanted to witness the forum. So we walked up to Archea Agora Square, where we saw a pack of wild dogs snoozing in the shade, and onward to the forum beyond. Another sighting of a vast Roman settlement. A massive plaza in its centre but then tunnels and archways underneath, at its edge. To the right, an amphitheatre where Liam said discussions would have been held. Battling with the heat, we returned to the hotel for 14:00.

Watching some TV, it is interesting to observe how it compares to UK TV – and I do say that it is no competition. A TV show that looks like it is a 1990s repeat does actually seem to be recently made. So I opted for Eurosport – always modern!


It was on this day that I became aware of the depth of history of the city. I had known the regional history, but that it made its appearance in a city, hiding under grass, near the sea, next to more modern buildings, brought home the idea of Thessaloniki having more that what was being presented at first glance.

Since my visit, I have read Mark Mazower's Salonica: City of Ghosts (2004). This book enlightened me so much on the history of the city covering the last 500 years. Given that it rests within a Greek state, this city has been under Byzantine, Ottoman, German and Greek rule, and been targeted for rule by Bulgarians and Serbians. This was already known to me, but the diverse make up of the people that made this walled city was unknown. Most presentations of the city look at the Greek, Turkish or Bulgarian populations that inhabited this city, but lacking in study were the Jews who, up to 1912, were the largest ethnic group in Thessaloniki. The Ladidka is what remains of their physical presence in the centre. This was not only down to the mass slaughter on the city's dwindling population by the Nazi's during the course of World War II; but also because of great many a fire in the city over the years, or economic opportunities elsewhere. These residents and a host of other peoples resided in Thessaloniki over the centuries, ebbing and flowing in numbers as time went on. This book captures the vibrancy of how these people lived, how they were organised, what the customs were, and in what buildings they lived. One of my fascinations is the aesthetic beauty that buildings have, and my curiosity as to the intent of a certain style. At present the Modernist builds project rationality and purpose. But past building had other purposes that may be redundant now yet instead posses that aesthetic beauty somewhat more.

The home of Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, had Ottoman as its style, with its characteristic bay window which can still be seen today. On the note of Ataturk, who would now have been born in Greece, it should be remembered that after Greece took over Salonica, he was one of the Turkish generals engaged in the war between Greece and Turkey in 1923 that saw hundreds of thousands displaced. Greeks fled Anatolia, whilst Turks and Muslims fled to Turkey. This meant that by 1929, 75% of the city was now Greek. The Greek nationalising of the city could then begin in earnest.  

And it is this ethnic homogenisation, along with the binary of nationalisation/de-Ottomonization of Thessaloniki, that can be witnessed at present in the architectural and social structures of the city. This is what Maximilian Hartmuth observes in his article in Urban Life and Culture in Southeastern Europe (Roth and Brunnbauer, 2006). This leads on to the wider concepts of national identity, nationalism and citizenship, as categorisations of people, whether objective or subjective, and the processes that these concepts engage in or emanate from. But these will out in further debates. Only to finally say that Thessaloniki is a city that may seem 'modern' in its presentation, and Greek in its identification, but it has 'resided' in numerous states and empires, yet always remained regionally in 'Macedonia' (however one wishes to define its borders) whilst being historically diverse in its populations.

The ‘nationalism’ question in Communist states

Given the vast number of states that had Communist regimes during the 20^th century, this post will aim to compare the approaches to dealing with nationalism in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, during the early life of those regimes. In doing so, I will initially define terms such as ‘nationalism’, ‘nationality’ and the ‘nation’, using views expressed by leading scholars, and those held by leading Communists. This will enable me to link communism to nationalism as an ideology, and show how Communists understood the concepts of nation, nationalism and nationalities. I can then consider why Communists needed such definitions to enable them to establish their respective regimes, and to claim their legitimacy.

I will begin by comparing the various ways that the two regimes structured their societies and the functions that operated within it. I will look at the concept of self-determination, and judge whether these regimes followed the various components of what constitutes a nation, and to reflect on whether these considerations were met. I avoid commenting on whether the demise of these two states in the 1980’s and 1990’s stemmed from these policies, as it would be unfair not to include the other numerous factors that were involved in these processes that this post will not cover. I will finish by evaluating whether communism did indeed ‘deal’ with nationalism.

In order to understand nationalism, one must first look at the related notion of the nation. Both the nation and nationalism are modern phenomena, which both ethno-symbolist and modernist scholars on nationalism agree on (Smith, Gellner, Hobsbawm). Anthony Smith (The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 1988) begrudgingly accepts that nations can be modern, however he believes that there were ethnies prior to modernity, which had 6 characteristics, and contributed to the formation of modern nations and established lines of continuity. However his overall view implies that ethnies are somewhat rigid and bounded in structure and have not merged or split over time, which ties in to Ernest Gellner’s criticism (Nations and Nationalism, 2006). In the reverse of Smith’s argument, Gellner acknowledges that groups and cultures have always existed, but that over time they have had either firm and/or fluid boundaries. Modern nations however grew out of the radically altered social conditions that existed in the latter 18^th and early 19^th centuries that homogenized certain elements of pre-existing high cultures, aided by education, leading to the only unit that humans could identify with. These nations were therefore inventions, or social constructs, in the era of modernity. Albeit two conflicting arguments, there is common ground in both. Therefore I will employ Smith’s definition of an ethnie (An ethnie needs a name, common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinct shared culture, an association with a territory and a sense of solidarity) as a basis for a ‘nation’, and relate to Gellner’s idea that modern nations were created only because a certain set of conditions were reached, when analyzing the two states that are the focus of this post.

To define nationalism, I return to Gellner whose view it is that ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.’ Smith also agrees with this aspirational tone as the aim of nationalism, and concedes that today’s nation-states rarely have congruent lines. Eric Hobsbawm (Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality. 1991) also agrees with Gellner on his interpretation of nationalism, and adds that this principle is the bond between the people and the polity, and overrides all other obligations. I will return to this theme of legitimacy later on. But both agree that nationalism came before the nation, or as Hobsbawm puts it ‘Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around.’ It is this view that I align myself with, and hope to highlight during this post, in that states used nationalism as a vehicle for political legitimacy, and created nations. However, the boundaries of such terms as the ‘nation’ or ‘state’ will be picked up later.

Finally nationality, or national identity, can be described as identification with the nation-state or nation.  This can be how individuals describe themselves, or have it bestowed on to them as an individual. The different applications of this term will be evident in the rest of this post.

Having now defined the terms that I will use in this essay, I can now look to how communism viewed nationalism. Given that all attempts at creating Communist states have all tried to apply the theories of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, I will look to the Communist Manifesto for reference. In the founding document of communism, it states:

            ‘The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself as the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.’ (The Communist Manifesto 1848)

In essence, although the prime aim of communism was the abolition of countries, Mark and Engels believed that the working class must achieve political power within countries, thus to constitute the ‘nation’ itself. They go on to argue that although capitalism is already dissolving national differences, communism would achieve it faster. Imperialism of one nation over another would disappear, as exploitation of one man over another does.

The fundamental difference here is that communism sees nations only as vehicles on the route to communism, because embodied in the state is political power to achieve its ends; and ultimately it is internationalist as there would be no class differences or antagonisms. Nationalism on the contrary defines itself within borders, sets out to create differences from other groups so that it can ultimately wield political power over a nation within a state – thus create a nation-state. But my main focus is not on the ends but the means to reaching communism. The use of the nation and boundaries, for the proletariat to ascend to power, features heavily in the practice of communism.

One of the leading figures on nationalism in the USSR was Joseph Stalin, who in the early years of the Soviet Union was the Commissar for the Nationalities. In 1913 he developed his own definition of the nation. He explained that a ‘nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.’ (Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, 1935). His argument reflected the later views of Gellner when he wrote that nations belong ‘to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism.’ Thus Stalin laid the foundations for two similar future scholars. He preceeded Smith by defining characteristics of a nation, though not correlating exactly with the categorizations he used, but also accepted that the nation only arose out of industrialization.  

As for Yugoslavia, Josip Tito in 1941 co-wrote a resolution of the fifth conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, (The Party of the Revolution, 1980) which contained a section on ‘the struggle of national equality and freedom’. Instead of theoretical points he makes practical ones, focusing on the need for self-determination for the Macedonians, Albanians and other minorities from enemies both outside and inside Yugoslavia. Stalin also wrote on this point of self-determination, by allowing a nation to determine its own future. This can be seen in the state systems in the former USSR and former Yugoslavia.

The USSR was the first Communist country in the world therefore it did not have a country to look to for establishing its system, but it did have a legacy to deal with from the Russian Empire. Self-determination was the key to ensuring that the former empire, and all its nations, stayed within the new Soviet Union. Albeit it in opposition to the internationalist stance of communism, this approach was seen as necessary for it would promote further revolution. Walker Connor (The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 1984) takes a less theoretical and a more political stance on the context within which this policy developed. He believes that this policy was necessary because of several factors, mostly relating to internal political consolidation, and to ward off external threats. However, Connor points out that a change of heart soon came about and that socialism, or the unification of the working class, was re-established as the ultimate goal, so a proviso was added to statements regarding secession. However, the ‘working men of the world now had a country’.

Socialist Yugoslavia, on the other hand, formed after World War Two, when it had the experience of being united under a monarch, even if dismembered by the Axis powers. Prior to the war, the political discourse revolved around the structure of the state, and the balance of power between a strong centralized centre, and a loose confederal system, typified by the Serbs arguing for the former, and the Croats the latter. This power issue was linked to the desire for political control over territorial boundaries that existed within the state. It also had the legacy of being split by two former dominant empires, the Habsburg and Ottoman, along with all their cultural, social, political and economic baggage. The paradox here though was that at the time, the notion of one Yugoslav nation was preeminent. The idea of self-determination was a recruiting tool Tito used for his Partisan forces, attracting, notably, the Serbs domiciled within the Croatian republic borders, but also those residing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The use of ‘Yugoslav’ as a tool for mobilization, however, was omitted, and the national name of the audience being addressed was used.

From the start of Tito’s rule then, we can see that there were many obstacles to overcome when navigating the troubled waters of nationality and the nations. Tito opted for a federal state structure with which to deliver his socialist utopia. Silvo Devetak (The Equality of Nations and Nationalities in Yugoslavia, 1988) details five spheres of social relations that were regulated in Yugoslavia between the nations and nationalities. The legal, constitutional and institutional apparatus was the first of these. It followed strict rules in ensuring that the nations and nationalities were represented fairly and equally. They were allowed to express their cultural and linguistic differences, but also to interact with the state in their own tongue. Socio-economic considerations were met with targeted funds to those areas deemed ‘backwards’, for fear of dissent from the local nation that may raise national sentiments. The educational system was used to foster friendship and mutual understanding, but this was applied, and could only be effective, in the more diverse areas. Socio-political organizations were set up to get gather different groups together, and tried to be as broad as possible, such as the Socialist Youth League. Finally, the penal system outlawed the practice of national inequality and hatred. It was the exercise of the last point that was visible when Tito purged the Croatian party in the 1970’s.

Parallel to this was the structural issue of territorial boundaries. The ambiguity in the constitution arose around who had the right to self-determination. If one decided that the republics were the boundaries, then it would justify a claim by a nation to a ‘state’. However, if you invested in the nation the power for self-determination, then the lines are less clear. Therefore the system that operated in Yugoslavia institutionalized the differences between the nations, but also tried to blur the boundaries between the nation and republic. Through the use of nationalities within the republics and the guarantee of equality, they aimed to eliminate the desire for nations to seek assurances from a ‘mother’ nation, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s case, to be split by there being no majority nation.

In the USSR, although workingmen now had a country, to govern it, the Communists had to wear some of the nationalist’s clothes. Self-determination was still the language of the Communists, but the application of it was somewhat different and varied. Martin McCauley (The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1993) points to the strategy of korenizatsiya that allowed for the establishment of local institutions to be run by indigenous people. This would give the air of legitimacy to the regime, so that it wouldn’t be seen to be imperialist; yet carry out the diktats of the Party arriving from Moscow. A federal system of national and regional autonomous areas was therefore established. The original intent of Lenin and Stalin was that nations could determine their own future, on the assumption that if they chose to leave, then their bourgeois revolution would then lead to a socialist one and a return to the Soviet fold.

However, as McCauley points out, there were many obstacles here too. Firstly, there was only a limited proletariat in the Soviet Union, and it was its geographical fringes that lacked the education and skills to develop one. This led to increased Russian labour migration to these areas assigned for industrialization. An example of the rise in nationalism came via collectivization when the Ukrainians opposed this move in the 1930s. Secondly, the Communist Party itself was significantly made up of Russian members. A drive was initiated to increase non-Russian numbers, but subsequent purges led to their numbers dropping again. Thirdly, the use of local languages was enshrined in law, however there were disparities between those local speakers of languages, and those elites who were readers and writers of those indigenous or other languages. However, the Communist Party had its impact on this too, and in certain areas one language was favoured more than others, or the authorities would change between Latin, Cyrillic or Arabic scripts, dependent on its objectives in that nation; an example being the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet onto an original Latin text Moldavian language. Thus ‘Great Russian chauvinism’ quietly crept back into fashion, and at the same time standardized ‘national’ languages were codified.

These points by McCauley illustrate that ‘Leninist nationality policy deliberately promoted the formation of nations and the development of national languages and cultures. It was believed that these new nations would be socialist-orientated and would therefore support the building of socialism in the Soviet Union.’ Therefore Stalin’s characteristics of the nation, reflective of Smith’s, were used to bestow onto people a national identity and with that, a polity of Communists to govern the newly demarcated autonomous republics. These boundaries were sometimes arbitrary and some often created for political reasons, but given legitimacy because of state backing.

To conclude, the Communist states had a theoretical base upon which to assume that with the transition to socialism, nationalism would cease to exist. However, as realities hit those Communist leaders in the first decades when establishing their power, they had to go some way towards the goal of nationalism by providing for territorial borders for nations, and also creating new nations within borders they established. Smith’s ethnie is evident here in that Communist states couldn’t start from a blank page, but had recent historical/cultural baggage to deal with, so even the creation of a new ‘Soviet’ or ‘Yugoslav’ identity was a big task. Gellner’s view of nations being created in the context of certain circumstances is reflected by the fact that Communists sought to speed up industrialization and thus negatively gave a hand to developing nationalism.

Self-determination is a key idea that the two states shared. Through their employment of it they ensured that local leaders were loyal to the Party as opposed to their nation, allowing for the effective governing of those states. In Yugoslavia this was ambiguous as there were boundaries of the nation and similarly boundaries to the republics, and nationality was often fluid. In the USSR, boundaries were fixed and often drawn up to ensure it contained sizeable non-national groups, and nationality was determined at birth. Both of these methods sought to establish political control, as reflected on by Hobsbawm previously, and therefore needed nations and nationalities to rationally organize their societies; but in doing so they became exposed to nationalism. In short, communism couldn’t ‘deal’ with nationalism but instead it had to embrace it.