Independence, the ‘Transition’ and the Road to Ohrid (2/5)

The communist period had no bearing on the wider discussion on social democracy in its development or present state, other than on the impact of communist legacies from this period, which is highly relevant and will be pursued. Avoiding to address the causes of the collapse of communism, as this event was in no way influenced by social democracy, allows us to look at this as an historical fact in its influence upon social democracy, in that the League of Communists transformed into the later named Social Democratic Union of Macedonia and so social democracy could have parliamentary expression. 

Kiro Gligorov - First President of the Republic of Macedonia

Enter Democracy

Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott see that ‘democracy is a political system in which the formal and actual leaders of the government are chosen within regular intervals through elections based on a comprehensive adult franchise with equally weighted voting, multiple candidacies, secret balloting, and other procedures, such as freedom of the press and assembly, that ensure real opportunities for electoral competition.’ However, from this come many variables as to the practice of democracy, not just in Macedonia, but the world over. Further to this, these practices will, and often do, change over time. Hence there is a need to avoid applying non-communist democratization processes to post-communist states, as their experiences are starkly different. Dawisha and Parrott note these variables include the international discourse relating to democratization at the time, whether a state exists or needs to be created, the homogeneity of the population, the extent of political participation, the nature of the party and electoral systems, the legacies of communist elites in the new era, the functioning of political society and culture, and economic liberalization. However, for democracy to function an awareness of, and adherence to, the rules of the game is needed; a major component of this is the ability to accept defeat (Ghia Nodia). Yet, independence is linked to democracy via nationalism according to Ghia Nodia: ‘Whether we like it or not, nationalism is the historical force that has provided the political units for democratic government.’ Thus independence, even if only covering part of the Macedonian nation, fulfilled the political goal of nationalism, and thus provided a space for democracy to function. Nationalism has been said to be able to either unite or divide a country, but a state that has to cater for a sizeable ‘other’ nation within its borders creates problems in the configuring of that state.

A State for the Nation?

During the transition to multi-party elections a debate on how to define the constitution of the new independent Republic of Macedonia emerged. The choice was simple; either an ethnic state for the Macedonian nation, which nationalists wanted and even sought to extend its boundaries to their brethren in Greece and Bulgaria, or a push for a civic state of individual citizens. The balance was between group rights and individual rights, but fundamentally it was about inclusion and exclusion. President Gligorov had to balance the demands of nationalists on both sides of the ethnic divide who thought in group terms. However, the result didn’t appease either side and highlights the downside to democracy. Donald Horowitz states that ‘The problems of inclusion and exclusion do not disappear when new institutions are being adopted and put into operation. At these points, conceptions of the scope of the political community will limit the participation of some groups in the institutions of the new regime.’ Therefore the ethnic divide that derived from nation building prior to independence, acted as the cleavage with which to include and exclude people using citizenship, when debating the relationship between the state and the nation(s) in the constitution during democratization. 

However, ethnic conflict was avoided, unlike elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. A model for explaining this from Gojko Vuckovic involves two dichotomies, the first are ethnic violence and ethnic accommodation, and the second are whether integration or disintegration results. The alignment of certain variables place states, at different times, within this matrix. Macedonia during the transition managed to resist ethnic violence and disintegration by functioning within a multiethnic state system through bargaining between the groups. Given that democracy is in essence competition, the management of these divisions expressed during competition is necessary in an ethnically divided society.

Development of the Electoral and Party Systems

The role of the electoral and party systems, which are interlinked, initially helped eased tensions because this is where groups or individuals engage in the democratic process. Yet set in an ethnic frame, these became institutionalized and thus hard to change in the future. The electoral system after independence elected officials via a two round system, it then moved to a mixed one with elements of proportional representation, to one of full proportional representation for the 2000 elections (Peter Emerson and Jakub Sedo). Although democratic in theory, the definition of democracy, as previously illustrated, was open to interpretation. The setting of constituency boundaries is one mechanism by which ethnic divisions and exclusion can be fostered, either by grouping ethnicities separately or by demographically engineering a mono-ethnic victory in a mixed area (Horowitz). Given the minority status of the Albanians, numbering 25.1% of the population in 2001, they could never achieve power at the national level alone. So it became an unspoken rule, then codified in 2001, that the winning ethnic Macedonian party would include Albanians in the coalition. However, this is assuming that ethnic groups vote for ethnic parties, which sadly was the case in the 1990s and beyond. There remains an element of ideological difference between the two dominant ethnic Macedonian parties, yet all parties were more or less led by identifiable leaders of an ethnic type. In summary, Lenard Cohen and John Lampe state ‘Questions of party ideology or socioeconomic cleavages between the two largest ethnic Macedonian parties have been less important. There has been considerable partisan identification by adherents within the two parties, and a low rate of voter movement between the two organizations.’

So what we have are two mutually supportive processes whereby an ethnically divided party system is supported by a proportionally representative electoral system that reifies ethnic difference and exclusion, which gradually come to institutionalize ethnic politics in the state. This consociational form of government, as detailed by Arend Lijphart, may not provide majority rule but it ultimately provides stability, and that is its purpose. This stability rests on the attitudes of the political elites along with the type of political culture and extant subsystem autonomy in action. Pessimistically, this insinuates that a move to an ideologically based party politics will be difficult because of this institutionalization. This I will approach further on. However, debates on minorities in the party systems have failed to address minorities within dominant parties in multi-ethnic societies.

The Conflict over Macedonia™ 

Since independence, disputes over the unique identity of ethnic Macedonians have fed both internal ethnic divisions and external foreign relations, leading to a test of the country’s stability. The perceived threats were to the cultural, historical and ethnic nature of Macedonian identity and thus seen as a threat to the security of the state itself.

Ulf Brunnbauer’s polemic on historiography in Macedonia argues that during socialism, the task of creating the Macedonian nation was ongoing, yet after socialism’s collapse it actually intensified. He believes that this is because there was a need to provide continuity, in the economy and administration, which included the sciences. The creation of myths aided by historians could not go against this continual nation building, so it progressed. But its foundations were in the very period mentioned earlier, immediately after the Second World War. So Brunnbauer argues that in the 1990s ‘Any Macedonian national narrative that wanted to present the events on the territory of “Macedonia” as Macedonian national history was bound to come into conflict with these older historiographies.’ Greece was the main threat to Macedonian nationhood. The disputes ranged from what the independent state should be called and the design of the flag, to the more recent claim to Alexander the Great in order to trace the history of present day Macedonians to ‘ancient Macedon’. From the Greek perspective, this highlighted Macedonian expansionist intent for northern Greece. According to Loring Danforth, underlying impacts such the suspension of economic relations by Greece in 1994, international recognition of the republic, and the situation of Macedonians outside its borders all added to Macedonia’s problems stemming from its identity crisis. Ultimately ‘the Macedonian Question is a symbolic conflict that centers on the construction (or production) of conflicting ethnocentric national narratives.’ (Roudometof). This links to Hobsbawm and Ranger’s thesis on the invention of traditions, and is built upon the definition of where Macedonia is and the historical origins of the nation, which I tackled in the previous chapter. 

An important point to note is that by the time of independence, everyone under forty five years of age had been born within this Macedonian national culture. So, irrespective of claims to the ‘creation’ of Macedonians, this is what people were socialized into, how they understood their history, and went about ‘existing’ as a nation with a state in the 1990s and beyond.

Ethnic Division and the Pull of Nationalism

As the 1990’s came to a close, along with the symbolic contest with Greece, ethnic tensions within Macedonia began to increase. During this period, UNPROFOR then UNPREDEP was in the country providing stability and peace at the request of the President. However, their departure in 1999 along with the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo led to a renewed politicization of the ethnic Albanians domestically. The binary of inclusion and exclusion were in evidence during this period and reflective in the processes and discourses previously outlined. Strikingly leaders didn’t want independence or incorporation into Albania. Instead they grew tired of the political system that had not answered their calls for Albanian rights. These issues included language and education rights, one important example being the request for a university in Tetovo taught in the Albanian language. The failure of the system, the political parties as actors within this system, and of events outlined, altered the variables that kept the peace, which led to a challenge to the state’s stability. ‘Feelings of insecurity and lingering threat perceptions also contributed to the Macedonian majority’s reluctance to respond favorably to Albanian demands for expanded rights in the areas of education, language and state employment.’ (Jenny Engström). The incompatibility of Albanian nationalist demands with that of Macedonian nationalism present in the state, as well as the feeling of inclusion and exclusion from the state and access to power, led to a security dilemma and conflict (Thomas Hylland Eriksen). The unrest was situated in the Albanian areas, and the guerilla forces were clashing with Macedonian state forces. A political solution was fashioned and agreed by the two ethnic Macedonian parties and two ethnic Albanian parties at the time in 2001. The deal fulfilled the demands sought by Albanians the previous decade involved in the parliamentary process, but had now been accepted after violent conflict, and resulted in the National Liberation Army leader, Ali Ahmeti, entering the formal political system. But of importance was the fact that the state remained intact and the decentralization of power was agreed as a solution to end perceived ethnic oppression. However, ‘the decentralization model in Macedonia did little to de-ethnicize political loyalties or transcend intergroup conflicts…’ (Cohen and Lampe)

During this period a political culture developed, but one that may not have been suited to the changing situations in the country. A delicate balance of factors and pressures meant that although nationalist sentiments could be observed in the politics of the country, ethnic conflict was avoided for a considerable period. It was when the equilibrium between these factors altered that led to conflict.

The Development and Consolidation of the Macedonian Nation (1/5)

This series of posts are re-drafts of my dissertation entitled '20 Years On: Social Democracy in Macedonia'. This piece was written in the summer of 2012, and involved my spending a week in Skopje speaking to individuals in the SDSM and wider social democratic movement. This first post sets the scene and provides an historical overview of the emergence of Macedonian nation.

(Macedonia - without borders both cognitive and material)

Three important historical developments impact on how social democracy in Macedonia constitutes itself today. The first two, to be covered here, from the pre-democratisation period are, the development of the Macedonian nation and the establishment of the first republic for Macedonians. An understanding of these place contemporary issues surrounding national identity, nationalism, and relations with neighbours in an historical footing. The establishment of a republic for the Macedonians, within the context of a Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), puts forth arguments as to why the communist political leadership pursued this task and would have future implications for the Social Democratic Unions of Macedonia in the post-independence era. 

Nation and Nationalism – Definitions

But first, I must clarify what I see are the definitions of ‘nations’ and ‘nationalism’. I use Benedict Anderson’s understanding that the nation ‘is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.’ For nationalism, Ernest Gellner’s definition that ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.’ and Eric Hobsbawm’s observation that ‘Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around.’ are my anchor and both hold true in the case of Macedonia.

The ‘Macedonian Question’ in the 19th and 20th Centuries

The emergence of the ‘Macedonian Question’ arose during the latter part of the 19th century at a time when established territories surrounded the region whilst it was still formally part of the Ottoman Empire. In the words of Barbara and Charles Jelavich ‘When the struggle over Macedonia became more heated after the Congress of Berlin, anthropologists, linguists, and physiologists from the Balkan countries all used their specialty to claim the area for their own particular nationality.’ Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece were the three states that eyed the region, whose population was a diverse mix. The attributes for their claims came from religion, language, education, history, and culture; and were easily contested. Fundamentally, the geographic-strategic importance of this area for territorial expansion, economic gain and possible regional power status, were the reasons these claims were made, and backed by the ‘Great Powers’. Ottoman era social structures were breeding grounds for these contests, especially in regards to the church organization, to which language and education were tied; yet pro-Ottoman sympathies resulted from these clashes coming from all sides. The Balkan War of 1912 was fought to overthrow Ottoman rule, and Macedonia was split between the three states; however Bulgaria was unhappy and a second war in 1913 erupted, the result of which was the Treaty of Bucharest. During this period the people’s ‘perception from below’ in the region could be characterized as ‘not necessarily national and still less nationalist.’ according to Eric Hobsbawm. But this was of lesser importance for these belligerent states, which previously based territorial claims on co-nationals, but that soon became redundant.

The Foundations of Macedonian National Consciousness

Although a small group of people began to attest to a unique Macedonian national movement in the last decade of the 19th century, especially the establishment of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in 1893, their sympathies were specifically Bulgarian (Jelavich and Jelavich). In applying Victor Roudometof’s ‘thesis that national identity is socially constructed, fluid, situational, and modified through encounters and interaction with other groups, thereby fostering the necessity for boundary preservation and the exaggeration of cultural difference.’, one can see that these clashes could be unending. In Ottoman administrative records there was no categorization of Macedonians with a distinct identity. The idea that the people in the region were a ‘blank canvass’ upholds Roudometof’s constructivist approach. However ‘the notion that Macedonian Slavs were not yet Serbs or Bulgarians was the germ of the idea that they formed a distinct ethnic category, neither Serbian nor Bulgarian’, according to Roudometof. This idea has its legacy in contemporary debates in the region. The debate amongst the intelligentsia revolved around delineating where Macedonia was, its administrative position within the Ottoman Empire, and took on attempts to unite the Christians of the region through a Bishopric. Although multi-ethnic autonomy was their aim, including during the Ilinden Uprising in 1903, the division of the region during the Balkan Wars took on a more important meaning. So, up to the Balkan Wars the region had become defined and markers were established as to who people were not; yet the division of this ‘imagined’ area (up to that point in time) sowed the seeds for future discontent.

Between the Two World Wars

After this territorial division of ‘Ancient Macedonia’ into Pirin, Aegean and Vardar Macedonia, and its subsequent codification after World War I, demographic consolidation occurred. Greece settled Greeks from Turkey in their area and established demographic dominance, whereas in Bulgaria the ‘Macedonian Question’ played heavily on domestic politics. Focusing on the Vardar region, whose borders are co-terminus with those of present-day Macedonia, assimilation was attempted by the Serbs with the aim to de-Bulgarize the region via methods such as name changing. Again, Macedonians weren’t acknowledged in the 1921 and 1931 census calculations as a separate entity, but were counted as Serb or as speaking Serbocroat according to Joseph Rothschild. Politically, Ivo Banac notes that in the 1920 elections ‘The chief beneficiary of Macedonian discontent was the Communist Party, which won 36.72 percent of all Macedonian votes…’ doing better in the urban areas of Kumanovo, Skopje and Tikves. Communism also provided an ideological alternative to nationalism in the region at the time, seeking to establish a Balkan Federation. However, with no sizeable proletariat, they sought to exploit national oppression for social revolution. According to Pavlos Hatzopolous the ‘nationalization’ of the peoples of the Macedonia region by the conquering states proved ripe for this agitation, even if it ultimately failed. Whilst de-Bulgarization, Serbianization, and the Comintern agreeing the existence of a Macedonian nation in 1934, were ongoing processes and events, Alexander Maxwell believes that the masses simply wanted an easy life and identified with whichever state controlled their area.

From World War II to a Socialist Republic of Macedonia

Alexander Maxwell continues that with the arrival of World War II to the Balkans in 1941 came the governance of the most part of Vardar Macedonia by the Bulgarians. At first they were welcomed, but re-Bulgarization and the removal of local elites, as well as the effects of war and displaced peoples, led to increasing support for Tito and the Partisans. The Partisans establishing a Macedonian literary language in 1944 accelerated this. ‘Macedonia’s Slavs simultaneously espoused both “regional Macedonian nationalism” and “ethnic Bulgarian nationalism” in the early twentieth century, but by 1945 an “ethnic Macedonian nationalism” incompatible with Bulgarian loyalties had emerged.’ Rooted in language, Tito sought to capitalize on this. It justified his attempt to gain control of Macedonia, retain it, eliminate Bulgarian national consciousness, and ultimately to act as a step to Yugoslav regional hegemony, according to Stephen Palmer and Robert King. The ‘Macedonian Question’ was a useful vehicle for this, and can be judged as a success in comparison to the strategy employed by interwar communists as suggested by Hatzopolous.

Only with the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, albeit obligated to be part of the Socialist Federal Yugoslavia, could state resources create the Macedonian nation. This was achieved by creating schools, a university and a press in this new Macedonian language. Added to this was the longer-term goal of acquiring an independent Orthodox Church. Thus the state existed because of communism, so when the Tito consolidated the communist organization in the republic via patronage and trading political and economic centralism for cultural autonomy, he could command the loyalty of large sections of the population (Ulf Brunnbauer). But fundamentally, echoing Hobsbawm, ‘the republic was established, but the nation had still to be created.’

The ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian conflict of 2001 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The violent conflict that erupted within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) can generally be described as one between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Slavic Macedonians during 2001. One source puts the death toll from 150 to 250, with at least 650 casualties on both sides. Added to this are the tens of thousands of civilians that fled their homes, with many yet to return; and at one point the Macedonian state lost control of up to 20% of its territory (J. Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 2004). This case study aims to elucidate the varying factors that contributed to the escalation of tensions, emanating from the growing distance between Albanians and Slavic Macedonians, which has occurred since FYROM’s independence in 1991. I will account for the contentious issues that have been highlighted by scholars as being central to this conflict, whilst developing a sense of each ethnic group’s identity. I will then analyse various accounts as to what motivated the escalation of the conflict towards violent actions. I will do so using theories of ethno-political conflicts that look to the impact of the transition from Communism, insecurity and political power struggles, as well as other possible theories. I will conclude by looking at how a resolution to the conflict came about and assess whether this has been a success.

The political context at the start of the conflict needs to be understood, as it was a political solution rather than a military one, which ended it. Heading the Government of the Republic of Macedonia was the right-wing, nationalist ‘Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity’ (VMRO-DPMNE) party led by Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski, in coalition with the ethnic Albanian Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) led by Arben Xhaferi. The President of the Republic was Boris Trajkovski also from VMRO-DPMNE. The main opposition was the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), also an ethnic Albanian party. The population of the country was over 2 million people and its ethnic composition was estimated as being between 64-66% Macedonian and 23-25% Albanian, the rest comprising other minority groups. The Albanians were concentrated in the western and northern parts of Macedonia. Specifically, the conflict was between the forces of the Macedonian state on one side, and the National Liberation Army, led by Ali Ahmeti, on the other. It came 10 years after the Republic’s independence, during which time an ethnic Slavic Macedonian party and an ethnic Albanian party were in some form of coalition. It also occurred 2 years after the international community’s attention was focused on the plight of Albanians in neighbouring Kosovo.

The first and long running political issue was of the position of the Albanians as a group in the Republic of Macedonia, which was expressed in terms of nationality and citizenship. During the formation of a new constitution, nationalist Macedonians wanted the new state to be a national state of the Macedonian people, whereas the moderate Macedonians and Albanians wanted a civil state for all its citizens. What emerged in the preamble was a compromise whereby the state belonged to the Macedonian people, with the Albanians being mentioned elsewhere as a ‘nationality’. Albanians viewed their status as a nationality, newly equating them to Vlachs and Roma, as a downgrade from the middle ranking they had in Socialist Yugoslavia’s allocation of peoples, nationalities and ethnic groups (J. Engstrom, Democratisation and the Prevention of Violent Conflict, 2009). The issue of citizenship inflamed the already tense situation. The November 1992 Law on Citizenship automatically made 90% of the inhabitants citizens of the state, however ‘the law also postulated that only those born in the republic and those who were ethnic Macedonians were considered Macedonian citizens.’ (V. Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict, 2002). Albanian demands were backed up by their own numerical claims, which went beyond the stated 25%, to 35 or 40% (Engstrom). From a Macedonian perspective, they would not compromise on giving the Albanians constitutive nation recognition as it could have compromised the territory of the state through secession (A. Ivanov, The Balkans divided, 1996). Also, ‘In ethnic Macedonians’ view, the ethnic Albanians’ numbers, their sharply demarcated national identity, and their vociferous political aspirations considerably outweigh the scope of rights conventionally accorded to national minorities.’ (H. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 2003).

The second issue was the provision of university education in Albanian. At a constitutional level, the Macedonians weren’t going to recognize Albanian as an official language (Ivanov). In education, they provided for a small faculty in the main University in Skopje so didn’t feel compelled to do more. Thus the University of Tetovo was founded in February 1995 upon the initiative of the Albanian community, but was shut down by the authorities, a sign of the familiar fear of Albanian secessionism by the Macedonians. (Phillips). At the same time, however, the university in Skopje was in need of reform and financial aid, so wasn’t given attention by the state either. This leads to other cultural factors, such as the right to raise the Albanian flag. The symbolism of not being able to raise the Albanian flag, as imprisonment was the punishment, fed into the wider discourse of Albanian discrimination by the Macedonian state. (Liotta & Jebb, Mapping Macedonia, 2004). Discrimination was also evident in the economic sector. Along with the disadvantages of not being able to further their education in their native language, Albanians couldn’t access employment in the public sector. By 2001 only 3.1% of the military and police force comprised of ethnic Albanians. (Phillips). This was apparent in the private sector too where an illegal economy was operating twinned with corruption involving the political establishment, and only served to underpin already held prejudices by the Macedonians of the Albanians. (Engstrom). Amongst the series of demands by the Albanians there was a distinct lack of calls for secession, even with the murmurs after independence a political solution was desired prior to the conflict in 2001. However ‘Feelings of insecurity and lingering threat perceptions also contributed to the Macedonian majority’s reluctance to respond favourably to Albanian demands for expanded rights in the areas of education, language and state employment.’ (Engstrom). In summary, the conflict between the two ethnic groups, brewing since independence, was displayed through political, economic, cultural and social struggles by both political elites and the masses, with each side taking a different perspective to the other.

But what factors aggravated the situation, to turn the dispute over these issues into a violent clash between the Macedonian authorities and the NLA? It is interesting at first to note that the demands that the NLA made, a couple of months after the violence began, were more or less the same as the Albanian politicians. But the NLA sought to reach those aims through violence and steadily won over the support of ordinary Albanians in Macedonia, yet still not aiming for a ‘Greater Albania’. (Roudometof). Support shifted to the NLA from the leaders of the ethnic Albanian DPA and PDP parties because Albanians were growing wary of promises not being fulfilled. This inertia in government fed into the Albanians perception that ‘their’ leaders were just cosmetic cover for Macedonians to present itself to the ‘International Community’. However, for the Macedonians, the violence just proved their point that Albanian demands shouldn’t be met. This links to issues of trust and insecurity that Macedonians had with their identity and the process of nation building, if one takes Victor Roudometof’s view that it is a construct. (Roudometof). So a dual process of protecting the state and protecting the nation went hand in hand, the former from external threats and the latter from internal ones. The response of the Macedonian state to the insurgency was the logical conclusion of this viewpoint. This feeds into Will Kymlicka’s argument (‘Multiculturalism and minority rights’, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, Issue 4 2002) that Western minority rights ideas cannot be applied to Central Eastern Europe because it is ‘securitized’ by a fear of losing territory, hence the Macedonian rhetoric of Albanian secession. But Albanian claims of being victimized grew stronger.

Aside from these internal events, Kosovo had a crucial aggravating role. Macedonia bordered what was then still part of Serbian territory. Refugees came over the border for refuge during the crisis, and afterwards international KFOR forces were deployed to control the situation internally. The refugees affected Macedonians because of the demographic impact it would have on the states’ population, thus provided minimum help so they would eventually return. From the Albanian perspective it reminded them further of the need for reform as only small steps were being made. (Roudometof). Henryk Sokalski, the former head of UNPREDEP, who was stationed in Macedonia from 1995 to 1998, gave a sober assessment of the situation: ‘The absence of UNPREDEP […], KFOR’s exclusive concentration on Kosovo, and the inadequate resources of the Macedonian army created a haven for such activities and easy illegal cross border traffic.’ Although the Macedonian state wished to protect the state and nation, the opposite occurred.

The trigger for the ethnic conflict in 2001 was the reassigning of territory from Serbia/Kosovo to Macedonia, but confusion remains over who began the spiral of violence. The event centered on Tanusevci, home to predominantly Albanian families. One argument is that it was the failure to secure independence in Kosovo that saw the national liberation movement being exported to Macedonia. (Phillips). Another argument criticizes the Macedonian interpretation of events, that NATO failed to protect the border from Kosovo extremists and discounts the claim that the goal of the Albanians was unity and secession, by quoting the NLA’s aims from 5 March. (Roudometof). However they both agree that the town symbolized the start of the conflict. So ‘the ineffective response of the Macedonian security forces allowed this local difficulty to escalate, coupled with the Macedonian political rhetoric, which demonized the Albanian population, igniting the ethnic Albanians’ simmering resentment of perceived discrimination.’ (M. Laity, Preventing war in Macedonia, 2008). The media propagated a large part of this demonization for their ethnic Macedonian audience.

Economic considerations also became a factor and can be linked to the issue over the borders and security. The effects of moving from a command economy to a market one, the inability to get loans due to lack of international recognition, the 1993 UN sanctions on trade with Serbia, and the economic blockade by Greece that cut off export links to Thessaloniki in 1994 all contributed to difficult economic circumstances that affected the Albanians disproportionately. (Sokalski). Less protection on the borders with neighbouring states fuelled the illegal economy and black market trade and in turn took on an ethnic character. A final factor was the lack of a fully developed civil society to overcome the widening ethnic divisions in the country and to challenge the political elite on both sides. One scholar writing before the conflict noted that ‘The Republic of Macedonia may be said to be going through an endurance test, where multicultural civility must prevail over ethno-nationalist seizures.’ (J. Schwartz in Halpern & Kideckel, Neighbours at War, 2000).

The conflict continued to escalate violently and spread to other parts of northern and western Macedonia after the events in Tanusevci. Only dialogue or a military victory could resolve the situation. At the beginning the Macedonian state believed that a military solution was the only option, and the NLA obviously had no faith in the Albanian political leaders, so came to the same conclusion. But neither side could exact a military victory, nor were they willing to open up a dialogue. All the while, the two ethnic groups gravitated towards ‘their’ ethnic kin, accelerated by Macedonian rhetoric on the NLA (Liota & Jebb). A ‘Unity Government’ was formed by the 4 main ethnic political parties under the President, through NATO and EU intervention. A final deal involved liaison work between the two sides, which included handling local situations so that neither side lost face or could claim to have retreated in the context of the wider conflict being resolved. Again, media handling played a crucial role. (Laity). One should be mindful of Gareth Evans’ discussion (‘Ethnopolitical conflict’, Ethnopolitics, 10:1 2011) over the need to balance the right to intervene with state sovereignty, that preventative action has the most effect. Although invited, UNPREDEP was a success in that violent conflict was avoided during the 1990s. However, once it was gone it highlighted the essential need for third party help. The resulting Ohrid Framework Agreement set about to disarm the NLA, and provided for political and constitutional changes (Liotta & Jebb).

Although a political agreement ended the conflict, it was the nature of the political system that let down the two ethnic groups. The consociational model of democracy (Ljiphart, ‘Consociational Democracy, World Politics, 21:2 1969) that allowed Albanians and Macedonians to have a share in ruling the country prior to the conflict was the obstacle to fulfilling Albanian and Macedonian demands, and therefore had its limitations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement tried to devolve power for local majorities to govern more effectively. Another consequence is that the NLA leader is now a leader of the Democratic Union for Integration and in the government.

Any notion of ‘ancient hatreds’ doesn’t come close to explaining the violence in FYROM. In sum, Stuart Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory (Modern Hatreds, 2001) covers many of the factors that accounted for the escalation in the conflict. Elite rhetoric backed up by symbols linked to myths and fears provokes mass hostility to create a security dilemma. This is what occurred in Macedonia with the backdrop of all that came before it since independence. Eleven years after the conflict, events are started to turn once again, viewed through an ethnic prism (Balkan Insight reporting 2012).

The ‘nationalism’ question in Communist states

Given the vast number of states that had Communist regimes during the 20^th century, this post will aim to compare the approaches to dealing with nationalism in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia, during the early life of those regimes. In doing so, I will initially define terms such as ‘nationalism’, ‘nationality’ and the ‘nation’, using views expressed by leading scholars, and those held by leading Communists. This will enable me to link communism to nationalism as an ideology, and show how Communists understood the concepts of nation, nationalism and nationalities. I can then consider why Communists needed such definitions to enable them to establish their respective regimes, and to claim their legitimacy.

I will begin by comparing the various ways that the two regimes structured their societies and the functions that operated within it. I will look at the concept of self-determination, and judge whether these regimes followed the various components of what constitutes a nation, and to reflect on whether these considerations were met. I avoid commenting on whether the demise of these two states in the 1980’s and 1990’s stemmed from these policies, as it would be unfair not to include the other numerous factors that were involved in these processes that this post will not cover. I will finish by evaluating whether communism did indeed ‘deal’ with nationalism.

In order to understand nationalism, one must first look at the related notion of the nation. Both the nation and nationalism are modern phenomena, which both ethno-symbolist and modernist scholars on nationalism agree on (Smith, Gellner, Hobsbawm). Anthony Smith (The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 1988) begrudgingly accepts that nations can be modern, however he believes that there were ethnies prior to modernity, which had 6 characteristics, and contributed to the formation of modern nations and established lines of continuity. However his overall view implies that ethnies are somewhat rigid and bounded in structure and have not merged or split over time, which ties in to Ernest Gellner’s criticism (Nations and Nationalism, 2006). In the reverse of Smith’s argument, Gellner acknowledges that groups and cultures have always existed, but that over time they have had either firm and/or fluid boundaries. Modern nations however grew out of the radically altered social conditions that existed in the latter 18^th and early 19^th centuries that homogenized certain elements of pre-existing high cultures, aided by education, leading to the only unit that humans could identify with. These nations were therefore inventions, or social constructs, in the era of modernity. Albeit two conflicting arguments, there is common ground in both. Therefore I will employ Smith’s definition of an ethnie (An ethnie needs a name, common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinct shared culture, an association with a territory and a sense of solidarity) as a basis for a ‘nation’, and relate to Gellner’s idea that modern nations were created only because a certain set of conditions were reached, when analyzing the two states that are the focus of this post.

To define nationalism, I return to Gellner whose view it is that ‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.’ Smith also agrees with this aspirational tone as the aim of nationalism, and concedes that today’s nation-states rarely have congruent lines. Eric Hobsbawm (Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality. 1991) also agrees with Gellner on his interpretation of nationalism, and adds that this principle is the bond between the people and the polity, and overrides all other obligations. I will return to this theme of legitimacy later on. But both agree that nationalism came before the nation, or as Hobsbawm puts it ‘Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around.’ It is this view that I align myself with, and hope to highlight during this post, in that states used nationalism as a vehicle for political legitimacy, and created nations. However, the boundaries of such terms as the ‘nation’ or ‘state’ will be picked up later.

Finally nationality, or national identity, can be described as identification with the nation-state or nation.  This can be how individuals describe themselves, or have it bestowed on to them as an individual. The different applications of this term will be evident in the rest of this post.

Having now defined the terms that I will use in this essay, I can now look to how communism viewed nationalism. Given that all attempts at creating Communist states have all tried to apply the theories of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, I will look to the Communist Manifesto for reference. In the founding document of communism, it states:

            ‘The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself as the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.’ (The Communist Manifesto 1848)

In essence, although the prime aim of communism was the abolition of countries, Mark and Engels believed that the working class must achieve political power within countries, thus to constitute the ‘nation’ itself. They go on to argue that although capitalism is already dissolving national differences, communism would achieve it faster. Imperialism of one nation over another would disappear, as exploitation of one man over another does.

The fundamental difference here is that communism sees nations only as vehicles on the route to communism, because embodied in the state is political power to achieve its ends; and ultimately it is internationalist as there would be no class differences or antagonisms. Nationalism on the contrary defines itself within borders, sets out to create differences from other groups so that it can ultimately wield political power over a nation within a state – thus create a nation-state. But my main focus is not on the ends but the means to reaching communism. The use of the nation and boundaries, for the proletariat to ascend to power, features heavily in the practice of communism.

One of the leading figures on nationalism in the USSR was Joseph Stalin, who in the early years of the Soviet Union was the Commissar for the Nationalities. In 1913 he developed his own definition of the nation. He explained that a ‘nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.’ (Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, 1935). His argument reflected the later views of Gellner when he wrote that nations belong ‘to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism.’ Thus Stalin laid the foundations for two similar future scholars. He preceeded Smith by defining characteristics of a nation, though not correlating exactly with the categorizations he used, but also accepted that the nation only arose out of industrialization.  

As for Yugoslavia, Josip Tito in 1941 co-wrote a resolution of the fifth conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, (The Party of the Revolution, 1980) which contained a section on ‘the struggle of national equality and freedom’. Instead of theoretical points he makes practical ones, focusing on the need for self-determination for the Macedonians, Albanians and other minorities from enemies both outside and inside Yugoslavia. Stalin also wrote on this point of self-determination, by allowing a nation to determine its own future. This can be seen in the state systems in the former USSR and former Yugoslavia.

The USSR was the first Communist country in the world therefore it did not have a country to look to for establishing its system, but it did have a legacy to deal with from the Russian Empire. Self-determination was the key to ensuring that the former empire, and all its nations, stayed within the new Soviet Union. Albeit it in opposition to the internationalist stance of communism, this approach was seen as necessary for it would promote further revolution. Walker Connor (The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, 1984) takes a less theoretical and a more political stance on the context within which this policy developed. He believes that this policy was necessary because of several factors, mostly relating to internal political consolidation, and to ward off external threats. However, Connor points out that a change of heart soon came about and that socialism, or the unification of the working class, was re-established as the ultimate goal, so a proviso was added to statements regarding secession. However, the ‘working men of the world now had a country’.

Socialist Yugoslavia, on the other hand, formed after World War Two, when it had the experience of being united under a monarch, even if dismembered by the Axis powers. Prior to the war, the political discourse revolved around the structure of the state, and the balance of power between a strong centralized centre, and a loose confederal system, typified by the Serbs arguing for the former, and the Croats the latter. This power issue was linked to the desire for political control over territorial boundaries that existed within the state. It also had the legacy of being split by two former dominant empires, the Habsburg and Ottoman, along with all their cultural, social, political and economic baggage. The paradox here though was that at the time, the notion of one Yugoslav nation was preeminent. The idea of self-determination was a recruiting tool Tito used for his Partisan forces, attracting, notably, the Serbs domiciled within the Croatian republic borders, but also those residing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The use of ‘Yugoslav’ as a tool for mobilization, however, was omitted, and the national name of the audience being addressed was used.

From the start of Tito’s rule then, we can see that there were many obstacles to overcome when navigating the troubled waters of nationality and the nations. Tito opted for a federal state structure with which to deliver his socialist utopia. Silvo Devetak (The Equality of Nations and Nationalities in Yugoslavia, 1988) details five spheres of social relations that were regulated in Yugoslavia between the nations and nationalities. The legal, constitutional and institutional apparatus was the first of these. It followed strict rules in ensuring that the nations and nationalities were represented fairly and equally. They were allowed to express their cultural and linguistic differences, but also to interact with the state in their own tongue. Socio-economic considerations were met with targeted funds to those areas deemed ‘backwards’, for fear of dissent from the local nation that may raise national sentiments. The educational system was used to foster friendship and mutual understanding, but this was applied, and could only be effective, in the more diverse areas. Socio-political organizations were set up to get gather different groups together, and tried to be as broad as possible, such as the Socialist Youth League. Finally, the penal system outlawed the practice of national inequality and hatred. It was the exercise of the last point that was visible when Tito purged the Croatian party in the 1970’s.

Parallel to this was the structural issue of territorial boundaries. The ambiguity in the constitution arose around who had the right to self-determination. If one decided that the republics were the boundaries, then it would justify a claim by a nation to a ‘state’. However, if you invested in the nation the power for self-determination, then the lines are less clear. Therefore the system that operated in Yugoslavia institutionalized the differences between the nations, but also tried to blur the boundaries between the nation and republic. Through the use of nationalities within the republics and the guarantee of equality, they aimed to eliminate the desire for nations to seek assurances from a ‘mother’ nation, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s case, to be split by there being no majority nation.

In the USSR, although workingmen now had a country, to govern it, the Communists had to wear some of the nationalist’s clothes. Self-determination was still the language of the Communists, but the application of it was somewhat different and varied. Martin McCauley (The Soviet Union 1917-1991, 1993) points to the strategy of korenizatsiya that allowed for the establishment of local institutions to be run by indigenous people. This would give the air of legitimacy to the regime, so that it wouldn’t be seen to be imperialist; yet carry out the diktats of the Party arriving from Moscow. A federal system of national and regional autonomous areas was therefore established. The original intent of Lenin and Stalin was that nations could determine their own future, on the assumption that if they chose to leave, then their bourgeois revolution would then lead to a socialist one and a return to the Soviet fold.

However, as McCauley points out, there were many obstacles here too. Firstly, there was only a limited proletariat in the Soviet Union, and it was its geographical fringes that lacked the education and skills to develop one. This led to increased Russian labour migration to these areas assigned for industrialization. An example of the rise in nationalism came via collectivization when the Ukrainians opposed this move in the 1930s. Secondly, the Communist Party itself was significantly made up of Russian members. A drive was initiated to increase non-Russian numbers, but subsequent purges led to their numbers dropping again. Thirdly, the use of local languages was enshrined in law, however there were disparities between those local speakers of languages, and those elites who were readers and writers of those indigenous or other languages. However, the Communist Party had its impact on this too, and in certain areas one language was favoured more than others, or the authorities would change between Latin, Cyrillic or Arabic scripts, dependent on its objectives in that nation; an example being the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet onto an original Latin text Moldavian language. Thus ‘Great Russian chauvinism’ quietly crept back into fashion, and at the same time standardized ‘national’ languages were codified.

These points by McCauley illustrate that ‘Leninist nationality policy deliberately promoted the formation of nations and the development of national languages and cultures. It was believed that these new nations would be socialist-orientated and would therefore support the building of socialism in the Soviet Union.’ Therefore Stalin’s characteristics of the nation, reflective of Smith’s, were used to bestow onto people a national identity and with that, a polity of Communists to govern the newly demarcated autonomous republics. These boundaries were sometimes arbitrary and some often created for political reasons, but given legitimacy because of state backing.

To conclude, the Communist states had a theoretical base upon which to assume that with the transition to socialism, nationalism would cease to exist. However, as realities hit those Communist leaders in the first decades when establishing their power, they had to go some way towards the goal of nationalism by providing for territorial borders for nations, and also creating new nations within borders they established. Smith’s ethnie is evident here in that Communist states couldn’t start from a blank page, but had recent historical/cultural baggage to deal with, so even the creation of a new ‘Soviet’ or ‘Yugoslav’ identity was a big task. Gellner’s view of nations being created in the context of certain circumstances is reflected by the fact that Communists sought to speed up industrialization and thus negatively gave a hand to developing nationalism.

Self-determination is a key idea that the two states shared. Through their employment of it they ensured that local leaders were loyal to the Party as opposed to their nation, allowing for the effective governing of those states. In Yugoslavia this was ambiguous as there were boundaries of the nation and similarly boundaries to the republics, and nationality was often fluid. In the USSR, boundaries were fixed and often drawn up to ensure it contained sizeable non-national groups, and nationality was determined at birth. Both of these methods sought to establish political control, as reflected on by Hobsbawm previously, and therefore needed nations and nationalities to rationally organize their societies; but in doing so they became exposed to nationalism. In short, communism couldn’t ‘deal’ with nationalism but instead it had to embrace it.