The ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian conflict of 2001 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The violent conflict that erupted within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) can generally be described as one between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Slavic Macedonians during 2001. One source puts the death toll from 150 to 250, with at least 650 casualties on both sides. Added to this are the tens of thousands of civilians that fled their homes, with many yet to return; and at one point the Macedonian state lost control of up to 20% of its territory (J. Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 2004). This case study aims to elucidate the varying factors that contributed to the escalation of tensions, emanating from the growing distance between Albanians and Slavic Macedonians, which has occurred since FYROM’s independence in 1991. I will account for the contentious issues that have been highlighted by scholars as being central to this conflict, whilst developing a sense of each ethnic group’s identity. I will then analyse various accounts as to what motivated the escalation of the conflict towards violent actions. I will do so using theories of ethno-political conflicts that look to the impact of the transition from Communism, insecurity and political power struggles, as well as other possible theories. I will conclude by looking at how a resolution to the conflict came about and assess whether this has been a success.

The political context at the start of the conflict needs to be understood, as it was a political solution rather than a military one, which ended it. Heading the Government of the Republic of Macedonia was the right-wing, nationalist ‘Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity’ (VMRO-DPMNE) party led by Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski, in coalition with the ethnic Albanian Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) led by Arben Xhaferi. The President of the Republic was Boris Trajkovski also from VMRO-DPMNE. The main opposition was the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), also an ethnic Albanian party. The population of the country was over 2 million people and its ethnic composition was estimated as being between 64-66% Macedonian and 23-25% Albanian, the rest comprising other minority groups. The Albanians were concentrated in the western and northern parts of Macedonia. Specifically, the conflict was between the forces of the Macedonian state on one side, and the National Liberation Army, led by Ali Ahmeti, on the other. It came 10 years after the Republic’s independence, during which time an ethnic Slavic Macedonian party and an ethnic Albanian party were in some form of coalition. It also occurred 2 years after the international community’s attention was focused on the plight of Albanians in neighbouring Kosovo.

The first and long running political issue was of the position of the Albanians as a group in the Republic of Macedonia, which was expressed in terms of nationality and citizenship. During the formation of a new constitution, nationalist Macedonians wanted the new state to be a national state of the Macedonian people, whereas the moderate Macedonians and Albanians wanted a civil state for all its citizens. What emerged in the preamble was a compromise whereby the state belonged to the Macedonian people, with the Albanians being mentioned elsewhere as a ‘nationality’. Albanians viewed their status as a nationality, newly equating them to Vlachs and Roma, as a downgrade from the middle ranking they had in Socialist Yugoslavia’s allocation of peoples, nationalities and ethnic groups (J. Engstrom, Democratisation and the Prevention of Violent Conflict, 2009). The issue of citizenship inflamed the already tense situation. The November 1992 Law on Citizenship automatically made 90% of the inhabitants citizens of the state, however ‘the law also postulated that only those born in the republic and those who were ethnic Macedonians were considered Macedonian citizens.’ (V. Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict, 2002). Albanian demands were backed up by their own numerical claims, which went beyond the stated 25%, to 35 or 40% (Engstrom). From a Macedonian perspective, they would not compromise on giving the Albanians constitutive nation recognition as it could have compromised the territory of the state through secession (A. Ivanov, The Balkans divided, 1996). Also, ‘In ethnic Macedonians’ view, the ethnic Albanians’ numbers, their sharply demarcated national identity, and their vociferous political aspirations considerably outweigh the scope of rights conventionally accorded to national minorities.’ (H. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 2003).

The second issue was the provision of university education in Albanian. At a constitutional level, the Macedonians weren’t going to recognize Albanian as an official language (Ivanov). In education, they provided for a small faculty in the main University in Skopje so didn’t feel compelled to do more. Thus the University of Tetovo was founded in February 1995 upon the initiative of the Albanian community, but was shut down by the authorities, a sign of the familiar fear of Albanian secessionism by the Macedonians. (Phillips). At the same time, however, the university in Skopje was in need of reform and financial aid, so wasn’t given attention by the state either. This leads to other cultural factors, such as the right to raise the Albanian flag. The symbolism of not being able to raise the Albanian flag, as imprisonment was the punishment, fed into the wider discourse of Albanian discrimination by the Macedonian state. (Liotta & Jebb, Mapping Macedonia, 2004). Discrimination was also evident in the economic sector. Along with the disadvantages of not being able to further their education in their native language, Albanians couldn’t access employment in the public sector. By 2001 only 3.1% of the military and police force comprised of ethnic Albanians. (Phillips). This was apparent in the private sector too where an illegal economy was operating twinned with corruption involving the political establishment, and only served to underpin already held prejudices by the Macedonians of the Albanians. (Engstrom). Amongst the series of demands by the Albanians there was a distinct lack of calls for secession, even with the murmurs after independence a political solution was desired prior to the conflict in 2001. However ‘Feelings of insecurity and lingering threat perceptions also contributed to the Macedonian majority’s reluctance to respond favourably to Albanian demands for expanded rights in the areas of education, language and state employment.’ (Engstrom). In summary, the conflict between the two ethnic groups, brewing since independence, was displayed through political, economic, cultural and social struggles by both political elites and the masses, with each side taking a different perspective to the other.

But what factors aggravated the situation, to turn the dispute over these issues into a violent clash between the Macedonian authorities and the NLA? It is interesting at first to note that the demands that the NLA made, a couple of months after the violence began, were more or less the same as the Albanian politicians. But the NLA sought to reach those aims through violence and steadily won over the support of ordinary Albanians in Macedonia, yet still not aiming for a ‘Greater Albania’. (Roudometof). Support shifted to the NLA from the leaders of the ethnic Albanian DPA and PDP parties because Albanians were growing wary of promises not being fulfilled. This inertia in government fed into the Albanians perception that ‘their’ leaders were just cosmetic cover for Macedonians to present itself to the ‘International Community’. However, for the Macedonians, the violence just proved their point that Albanian demands shouldn’t be met. This links to issues of trust and insecurity that Macedonians had with their identity and the process of nation building, if one takes Victor Roudometof’s view that it is a construct. (Roudometof). So a dual process of protecting the state and protecting the nation went hand in hand, the former from external threats and the latter from internal ones. The response of the Macedonian state to the insurgency was the logical conclusion of this viewpoint. This feeds into Will Kymlicka’s argument (‘Multiculturalism and minority rights’, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, Issue 4 2002) that Western minority rights ideas cannot be applied to Central Eastern Europe because it is ‘securitized’ by a fear of losing territory, hence the Macedonian rhetoric of Albanian secession. But Albanian claims of being victimized grew stronger.

Aside from these internal events, Kosovo had a crucial aggravating role. Macedonia bordered what was then still part of Serbian territory. Refugees came over the border for refuge during the crisis, and afterwards international KFOR forces were deployed to control the situation internally. The refugees affected Macedonians because of the demographic impact it would have on the states’ population, thus provided minimum help so they would eventually return. From the Albanian perspective it reminded them further of the need for reform as only small steps were being made. (Roudometof). Henryk Sokalski, the former head of UNPREDEP, who was stationed in Macedonia from 1995 to 1998, gave a sober assessment of the situation: ‘The absence of UNPREDEP […], KFOR’s exclusive concentration on Kosovo, and the inadequate resources of the Macedonian army created a haven for such activities and easy illegal cross border traffic.’ Although the Macedonian state wished to protect the state and nation, the opposite occurred.

The trigger for the ethnic conflict in 2001 was the reassigning of territory from Serbia/Kosovo to Macedonia, but confusion remains over who began the spiral of violence. The event centered on Tanusevci, home to predominantly Albanian families. One argument is that it was the failure to secure independence in Kosovo that saw the national liberation movement being exported to Macedonia. (Phillips). Another argument criticizes the Macedonian interpretation of events, that NATO failed to protect the border from Kosovo extremists and discounts the claim that the goal of the Albanians was unity and secession, by quoting the NLA’s aims from 5 March. (Roudometof). However they both agree that the town symbolized the start of the conflict. So ‘the ineffective response of the Macedonian security forces allowed this local difficulty to escalate, coupled with the Macedonian political rhetoric, which demonized the Albanian population, igniting the ethnic Albanians’ simmering resentment of perceived discrimination.’ (M. Laity, Preventing war in Macedonia, 2008). The media propagated a large part of this demonization for their ethnic Macedonian audience.

Economic considerations also became a factor and can be linked to the issue over the borders and security. The effects of moving from a command economy to a market one, the inability to get loans due to lack of international recognition, the 1993 UN sanctions on trade with Serbia, and the economic blockade by Greece that cut off export links to Thessaloniki in 1994 all contributed to difficult economic circumstances that affected the Albanians disproportionately. (Sokalski). Less protection on the borders with neighbouring states fuelled the illegal economy and black market trade and in turn took on an ethnic character. A final factor was the lack of a fully developed civil society to overcome the widening ethnic divisions in the country and to challenge the political elite on both sides. One scholar writing before the conflict noted that ‘The Republic of Macedonia may be said to be going through an endurance test, where multicultural civility must prevail over ethno-nationalist seizures.’ (J. Schwartz in Halpern & Kideckel, Neighbours at War, 2000).

The conflict continued to escalate violently and spread to other parts of northern and western Macedonia after the events in Tanusevci. Only dialogue or a military victory could resolve the situation. At the beginning the Macedonian state believed that a military solution was the only option, and the NLA obviously had no faith in the Albanian political leaders, so came to the same conclusion. But neither side could exact a military victory, nor were they willing to open up a dialogue. All the while, the two ethnic groups gravitated towards ‘their’ ethnic kin, accelerated by Macedonian rhetoric on the NLA (Liota & Jebb). A ‘Unity Government’ was formed by the 4 main ethnic political parties under the President, through NATO and EU intervention. A final deal involved liaison work between the two sides, which included handling local situations so that neither side lost face or could claim to have retreated in the context of the wider conflict being resolved. Again, media handling played a crucial role. (Laity). One should be mindful of Gareth Evans’ discussion (‘Ethnopolitical conflict’, Ethnopolitics, 10:1 2011) over the need to balance the right to intervene with state sovereignty, that preventative action has the most effect. Although invited, UNPREDEP was a success in that violent conflict was avoided during the 1990s. However, once it was gone it highlighted the essential need for third party help. The resulting Ohrid Framework Agreement set about to disarm the NLA, and provided for political and constitutional changes (Liotta & Jebb).

Although a political agreement ended the conflict, it was the nature of the political system that let down the two ethnic groups. The consociational model of democracy (Ljiphart, ‘Consociational Democracy, World Politics, 21:2 1969) that allowed Albanians and Macedonians to have a share in ruling the country prior to the conflict was the obstacle to fulfilling Albanian and Macedonian demands, and therefore had its limitations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement tried to devolve power for local majorities to govern more effectively. Another consequence is that the NLA leader is now a leader of the Democratic Union for Integration and in the government.

Any notion of ‘ancient hatreds’ doesn’t come close to explaining the violence in FYROM. In sum, Stuart Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory (Modern Hatreds, 2001) covers many of the factors that accounted for the escalation in the conflict. Elite rhetoric backed up by symbols linked to myths and fears provokes mass hostility to create a security dilemma. This is what occurred in Macedonia with the backdrop of all that came before it since independence. Eleven years after the conflict, events are started to turn once again, viewed through an ethnic prism (Balkan Insight reporting 2012).