Showing posts with label ethnic conflict. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ethnic conflict. Show all posts

Wednesday, 19 December 2018

Around the Balkans in 20 Days - Part 12


After the busy day travelling around yesterday, we emerged from our sleep a lot later than I would have allowed, given we had more exploring to do. But we had been on a little adventure, so today’s activities could be somewhat more relaxed. It must have been close to midday before we left the hotel. Bright sunshine beckoned us when we did depart, but we soon shied away and walked down the narrow main thoroughfare to ease its gaze.

John suggested that we should go and visit the Tunnel Museum. I had been curious to see this previously, but was not brave enough then to make the journey there by myself. I kept to the familiarity of the old town, and down to the Parliament building area.  So I eagerly agreed.

We found a kiosk and bought a tram ticket to head to Ilidza. This was the opposite end of Sarajevo to the old town. John was excited for the tram journey, again. We boarded the shabby tram that proved to be rather busy. We immediately stamped our ticket, as we were pre-warned to do, for fear of getting a fine. The journey was along the whole length of the route, so I was pleased that after 3 or 4 stops I secured a seat, with John following a stop later. A nice breeze came through the open windows above, with the metal on metal rattle of the wheels and track below pouring through.

As we passed the car hire place from yesterday, we entered unknown territory. Rows of concrete blocks of housing kept appearing to our left until we reached a big elevated road junction reminiscent, one abstractly assumed from above, of the Olympic rings logo. After we passed under this, single-level, bungalow-style housing then emerged. And there was a reason for this.

Soon enough, to our left there appeared two rows of wired fencing running alongside us. An expanse opened up behind it, and complicated lighting arrangements emerged. We were at one end of the runway for Sarajevo Airport. I suppose it took me by surprise, although it should not have, given we were going to visit the Tunnel Museum that was dug underneath the airport!

60 seconds later we crossed through a roundabout, then pulled up to our final destination. We got off the tram, and appeared to be in a small shopping area. The tram could continue around a teardrop shaped track to face back towards the old town. All the shops were flat roofed and modern in a 1970s sense; many of the food ones having canopies and rattan seating. There was an air of market day about it, with shoppers casually ambling around with bags half full.

Ilidza formed part of the Bosnian Serb forces territory during the siege, but it was now within the Federation (not Republika Srpska) entity. But not by much. We decided to head straight to the museum. I couldn’t locate any information online about public transport to it, so assumed there wasn’t any. We set off on foot and meandered around a few municipal buildings. We arrived at a wide road that had industrial units on the side facing the airport, and what must have been a registry office on the other side, as a wedding party was gathering outside. We walked in an easterly direction without any trees for shade, and had failed to buy any water too. We did stumble upon a brown sign a few hundred yards down the road, indicating the direction of the museum. So we turned off the wide road into a rather well to do suburb. A small stream ran past us, bubbling in front of the small plots containing detached housing. It was all pretty serene. We passed a small shop, no bigger than kiosk, which apparently sold bread. I couldn’t tell if it had closed many years ago, or just sold bread on an ad hoc basis. It seemed rather worn out, and given that the area we were in was the front line, I’m not surprised.

We continued walking, mostly following the free GPS on my phone, in the general direction of the museum. We only saw one other sign for it. Then the houses disappeared, and all of a sudden we were walking on open grassland. The airport looked very exposed. There was no pavement here, so when a car approached, we had to get on to the grass. To be fair, this only happened twice. In all, it took us about 40 minutes of walking to get here. The only noise to break the silence were two aircraft taking off, sending a booming and vibrating blast across the wide valley floor. 

The house upon which the tunnel was built was easily identifiable.  It really did bear the brunt of enemy fire by being on the front line. With the amount of bullet holes in it, it was remarkable the thing hadn’t just collapsed. It was typical of the style we had just walked passed. A stirring resemblance to houses in ski resorts, only on a smaller scale, with two floors, balcony, and a classic apex roof. You entered the museum down a side alley to the house, where a little wooden hut was constructed, set from the house. We paid the equivalent of £4 each and entered the back yard. This stretched about 100 yards towards the airport, and was a couple of yards wider than the house itself. In the bottom right corner was a modern wooden building of one level. This was the video room. Attached along the 8 ft high metal garden fencing was a written, chronological story of the tunnel that you followed round.


The story was fascinating. The airport was agreed, between the parties, to be a ‘neutral zone’, which meant it cut off the Bosnian Serbs from fully encircling the city; but also from allowing the Bosnian Government access to the city from territory it held. The Bosnian Government wanted to secure access, so the idea of a tunnel emerged to shift people and supplies back and forth. The owner of the house was an old lady, who allowed for this to take place. I believe she lived there throughout. What a torment for someone to sustain for all those years, especially witnessing the devastation to her house. As I gazed at a map of the city under siege, I noticed that the Bosnian Serb territory, which was merely hundreds of meters away, now corresponds to the demarcated internal border of the two entities. Republika Srpska was a short walk away.


We wondered into the house that had an assortment of displays on about the siege. But as you were directed to the basement, you became aware that you were going to the start of the tunnel. They kept the entrance to it open, and stabilized 50 yards of it. It was extremely claustrophobic, but luckily we only walked through it for seconds. We then emerged in the middle of the backyard. I had wandered what the little hole in the ground was! We visited the video room, but only for a few minutes, as we had garnered enough knowledge about the siege as we needed. Also, we were becoming a bit dehydrated.


We decided to leave after 45 minutes, and follow our footsteps back to Ilidza. As we rejoined the main road with the industrial buildings on it, a convoy of cars drove slowly past tooting their horns and waving flags out of the windows. It seems that the wedding had now finished, and this was the custom. I had seen this in Slovenia a few years ago, but it was still a joyful thing to see. It really created a community vibe to the wedding. This went on for the whole length of the road we walked, as they seemed to be doing laps!


When we returned to the market area, we decided to have a drink. We were parched and also needed shade from the sun. We picked a bar at random, but it happened to be on a thoroughfare so we could people watch. The one thing we should have not have done, was take this rest as a bit of a session for drinking. After about 2 hours of chatting and ordering more beers, as we didn’t want to move, we became rather pissed. I recall paying, buying a tram ticket, and then boarding the tram. The journey was pretty fuzzy back to the old town. However, as we walked through the old town, I remembered that I needed to send my friend a postcard that he requested (read: demanded). So I bought one, found a small post office in one of the old town shop fronts, paid my stamp and borrowed a pen. I scribbled a message, which I could not recall moments later, and posted it. I believe the person received it after we returned from the trip.

As we staggered back to the hotel, I noticed the first floor of a building that looked out on to the square of the old town where the Sebilj was located. It had etched into its yellow plaster a Star of David, and a box with words including the date 1873. These sorts of finds really fascinate me. What was this buildings’ purpose? Was it a synagogue, or did it serve another function? Who occupied it? John tried Wikmapia to see if it had the answer, but alas it did not. We returned to the hotel and took a long nap.


We woke up rather hungry, so John inspected Trip Advisor again and found an Italian near the flame memorial. We walked the length of the pedestrian pathway through the old town and Austro-Hungarian section, to reach the flame. We then turned immediately left into a very Germanic courtyard. This seemed to be a hub of activity, with a restaurant in every corner, spilling out into the courtyard. Our Italian was on the left. We were given a table for two in the mezzanine level, unfortunately next to a teenager’s birthday party. It was all very loud! The food was nice, and the candlelight brought a romantic feel to the restaurant. We then departed and returned to the club from last night. Perhaps we will have more luck in spotting some gays this time.

We arrived at the door and presented ourselves with our secretive knock, the door giving way soon after. We paid the minimal charge and went down. Tonight was a lot busier, very much the club ‘feel’ I was expecting the first night. We bought a couple of beers, then perched on a tall table near the exposed brick back wall. Many people were dancing in the pit area near the door and DJ booth. After a while we notice another couple that had entered and looked as new as us. They must have been tourists and seen the same Internet reviews of this place as we did. John went to the bar and they began chatting. Once they came over and after we exchanged pleasantries, it turns out that they both have a London link. One guy was from Germany originally but lived in London. His partner is from London originally but now resides in New York.

The rest of the night consisted of us all discussing our time in Sarajevo, where we had been, and to where we were travelling. At one point we decided we did not like the club, so ventured out. There were still throngs of people emptying out of the various film festival events. We ended up at a trendy bar on one of the back streets, but it seemed that all the other film ‘luvvies’ were there too. After too many beers, we then left our new friends and returned to the hotel at god-knows what hour.

Wednesday, 12 October 2016

Independence, the ‘Transition’ and the Road to Ohrid (2/5)

The communist period had no bearing on the wider discussion on social democracy in its development or present state, other than on the impact of communist legacies from this period, which is highly relevant and will be pursued. Avoiding to address the causes of the collapse of communism, as this event was in no way influenced by social democracy, allows us to look at this as an historical fact in its influence upon social democracy, in that the League of Communists transformed into the later named Social Democratic Union of Macedonia and so social democracy could have parliamentary expression. 



Kiro Gligorov - First President of the Republic of Macedonia

Enter Democracy

Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott see that ‘democracy is a political system in which the formal and actual leaders of the government are chosen within regular intervals through elections based on a comprehensive adult franchise with equally weighted voting, multiple candidacies, secret balloting, and other procedures, such as freedom of the press and assembly, that ensure real opportunities for electoral competition.’ However, from this come many variables as to the practice of democracy, not just in Macedonia, but the world over. Further to this, these practices will, and often do, change over time. Hence there is a need to avoid applying non-communist democratization processes to post-communist states, as their experiences are starkly different. Dawisha and Parrott note these variables include the international discourse relating to democratization at the time, whether a state exists or needs to be created, the homogeneity of the population, the extent of political participation, the nature of the party and electoral systems, the legacies of communist elites in the new era, the functioning of political society and culture, and economic liberalization. However, for democracy to function an awareness of, and adherence to, the rules of the game is needed; a major component of this is the ability to accept defeat (Ghia Nodia). Yet, independence is linked to democracy via nationalism according to Ghia Nodia: ‘Whether we like it or not, nationalism is the historical force that has provided the political units for democratic government.’ Thus independence, even if only covering part of the Macedonian nation, fulfilled the political goal of nationalism, and thus provided a space for democracy to function. Nationalism has been said to be able to either unite or divide a country, but a state that has to cater for a sizeable ‘other’ nation within its borders creates problems in the configuring of that state.

A State for the Nation?

During the transition to multi-party elections a debate on how to define the constitution of the new independent Republic of Macedonia emerged. The choice was simple; either an ethnic state for the Macedonian nation, which nationalists wanted and even sought to extend its boundaries to their brethren in Greece and Bulgaria, or a push for a civic state of individual citizens. The balance was between group rights and individual rights, but fundamentally it was about inclusion and exclusion. President Gligorov had to balance the demands of nationalists on both sides of the ethnic divide who thought in group terms. However, the result didn’t appease either side and highlights the downside to democracy. Donald Horowitz states that ‘The problems of inclusion and exclusion do not disappear when new institutions are being adopted and put into operation. At these points, conceptions of the scope of the political community will limit the participation of some groups in the institutions of the new regime.’ Therefore the ethnic divide that derived from nation building prior to independence, acted as the cleavage with which to include and exclude people using citizenship, when debating the relationship between the state and the nation(s) in the constitution during democratization. 

However, ethnic conflict was avoided, unlike elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. A model for explaining this from Gojko Vuckovic involves two dichotomies, the first are ethnic violence and ethnic accommodation, and the second are whether integration or disintegration results. The alignment of certain variables place states, at different times, within this matrix. Macedonia during the transition managed to resist ethnic violence and disintegration by functioning within a multiethnic state system through bargaining between the groups. Given that democracy is in essence competition, the management of these divisions expressed during competition is necessary in an ethnically divided society.

Development of the Electoral and Party Systems

The role of the electoral and party systems, which are interlinked, initially helped eased tensions because this is where groups or individuals engage in the democratic process. Yet set in an ethnic frame, these became institutionalized and thus hard to change in the future. The electoral system after independence elected officials via a two round system, it then moved to a mixed one with elements of proportional representation, to one of full proportional representation for the 2000 elections (Peter Emerson and Jakub Sedo). Although democratic in theory, the definition of democracy, as previously illustrated, was open to interpretation. The setting of constituency boundaries is one mechanism by which ethnic divisions and exclusion can be fostered, either by grouping ethnicities separately or by demographically engineering a mono-ethnic victory in a mixed area (Horowitz). Given the minority status of the Albanians, numbering 25.1% of the population in 2001, they could never achieve power at the national level alone. So it became an unspoken rule, then codified in 2001, that the winning ethnic Macedonian party would include Albanians in the coalition. However, this is assuming that ethnic groups vote for ethnic parties, which sadly was the case in the 1990s and beyond. There remains an element of ideological difference between the two dominant ethnic Macedonian parties, yet all parties were more or less led by identifiable leaders of an ethnic type. In summary, Lenard Cohen and John Lampe state ‘Questions of party ideology or socioeconomic cleavages between the two largest ethnic Macedonian parties have been less important. There has been considerable partisan identification by adherents within the two parties, and a low rate of voter movement between the two organizations.’

So what we have are two mutually supportive processes whereby an ethnically divided party system is supported by a proportionally representative electoral system that reifies ethnic difference and exclusion, which gradually come to institutionalize ethnic politics in the state. This consociational form of government, as detailed by Arend Lijphart, may not provide majority rule but it ultimately provides stability, and that is its purpose. This stability rests on the attitudes of the political elites along with the type of political culture and extant subsystem autonomy in action. Pessimistically, this insinuates that a move to an ideologically based party politics will be difficult because of this institutionalization. This I will approach further on. However, debates on minorities in the party systems have failed to address minorities within dominant parties in multi-ethnic societies.

The Conflict over Macedonia™ 

Since independence, disputes over the unique identity of ethnic Macedonians have fed both internal ethnic divisions and external foreign relations, leading to a test of the country’s stability. The perceived threats were to the cultural, historical and ethnic nature of Macedonian identity and thus seen as a threat to the security of the state itself.

Ulf Brunnbauer’s polemic on historiography in Macedonia argues that during socialism, the task of creating the Macedonian nation was ongoing, yet after socialism’s collapse it actually intensified. He believes that this is because there was a need to provide continuity, in the economy and administration, which included the sciences. The creation of myths aided by historians could not go against this continual nation building, so it progressed. But its foundations were in the very period mentioned earlier, immediately after the Second World War. So Brunnbauer argues that in the 1990s ‘Any Macedonian national narrative that wanted to present the events on the territory of “Macedonia” as Macedonian national history was bound to come into conflict with these older historiographies.’ Greece was the main threat to Macedonian nationhood. The disputes ranged from what the independent state should be called and the design of the flag, to the more recent claim to Alexander the Great in order to trace the history of present day Macedonians to ‘ancient Macedon’. From the Greek perspective, this highlighted Macedonian expansionist intent for northern Greece. According to Loring Danforth, underlying impacts such the suspension of economic relations by Greece in 1994, international recognition of the republic, and the situation of Macedonians outside its borders all added to Macedonia’s problems stemming from its identity crisis. Ultimately ‘the Macedonian Question is a symbolic conflict that centers on the construction (or production) of conflicting ethnocentric national narratives.’ (Roudometof). This links to Hobsbawm and Ranger’s thesis on the invention of traditions, and is built upon the definition of where Macedonia is and the historical origins of the nation, which I tackled in the previous chapter. 

An important point to note is that by the time of independence, everyone under forty five years of age had been born within this Macedonian national culture. So, irrespective of claims to the ‘creation’ of Macedonians, this is what people were socialized into, how they understood their history, and went about ‘existing’ as a nation with a state in the 1990s and beyond.

Ethnic Division and the Pull of Nationalism

As the 1990’s came to a close, along with the symbolic contest with Greece, ethnic tensions within Macedonia began to increase. During this period, UNPROFOR then UNPREDEP was in the country providing stability and peace at the request of the President. However, their departure in 1999 along with the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo led to a renewed politicization of the ethnic Albanians domestically. The binary of inclusion and exclusion were in evidence during this period and reflective in the processes and discourses previously outlined. Strikingly leaders didn’t want independence or incorporation into Albania. Instead they grew tired of the political system that had not answered their calls for Albanian rights. These issues included language and education rights, one important example being the request for a university in Tetovo taught in the Albanian language. The failure of the system, the political parties as actors within this system, and of events outlined, altered the variables that kept the peace, which led to a challenge to the state’s stability. ‘Feelings of insecurity and lingering threat perceptions also contributed to the Macedonian majority’s reluctance to respond favorably to Albanian demands for expanded rights in the areas of education, language and state employment.’ (Jenny Engström). The incompatibility of Albanian nationalist demands with that of Macedonian nationalism present in the state, as well as the feeling of inclusion and exclusion from the state and access to power, led to a security dilemma and conflict (Thomas Hylland Eriksen). The unrest was situated in the Albanian areas, and the guerilla forces were clashing with Macedonian state forces. A political solution was fashioned and agreed by the two ethnic Macedonian parties and two ethnic Albanian parties at the time in 2001. The deal fulfilled the demands sought by Albanians the previous decade involved in the parliamentary process, but had now been accepted after violent conflict, and resulted in the National Liberation Army leader, Ali Ahmeti, entering the formal political system. But of importance was the fact that the state remained intact and the decentralization of power was agreed as a solution to end perceived ethnic oppression. However, ‘the decentralization model in Macedonia did little to de-ethnicize political loyalties or transcend intergroup conflicts…’ (Cohen and Lampe)

During this period a political culture developed, but one that may not have been suited to the changing situations in the country. A delicate balance of factors and pressures meant that although nationalist sentiments could be observed in the politics of the country, ethnic conflict was avoided for a considerable period. It was when the equilibrium between these factors altered that led to conflict.

Tuesday, 12 July 2016

Thoughts on The Death Of Yugoslavia by Laura Silber and Allan Little


My reading of this text, in a way, ‘bookends’ my knowledge and study of South East Europe. It was my original viewing of the series The Death of Yugoslavia that drew my attention to the region two decades ago. So in this book I was seeking to find a deeper portrayal of events by the authors.

This text does not seek a theoretical understanding of the conflict, and it only fleetingly calls upon historical or anthropological perspectives on why events may have unfolded as they did. This is rather different to the TV show, whose audience included those not familiar in the history of the region, so could have led one to believe that their analysis of events was the classic ‘ancient hatreds’ paradigm. The start of the book clearly indicates this as not being so. Instead, the book walks the reader through a series of key events that the authors see as being essential to fueling the subsequent wars and ethnic cleansing.

Echoing the same timeline as the TV show, you get further insight to some of the events and key players in the drama that was taking place in the 1980s and 1990s. It cleverly portrays the balance between the agency of individuals and those of institutions, which led to the Yugoslav state’s collapse. 

Symbolic individuals are familiar; Milosevic, Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Kucan – all heads of the republics/states they sought, and eventually came, to control. However, the spotlight also moves onto other individuals who were aggressors, and even those trying to calm the rising ethnic tensions. Borisav Jovic was Milosevic’s right hand man. Holding various functions at the Serbian and Federal level, Jovic was one of the key disciples of Milosevic’s attempts initially to centralize power in the Yugoslav state, then into the goal of uniting all Serbs. Milan Babic and Milan Martic are two individuals in Knin who took on the Serb Nationalist mantle once independence was sought by Croatia. What began as the Croatian states’ attempts to impose law and order, soon escalated to Serbian defense of their villages and towns, drawing battle lines in the process.  The Croat Josip Reihl-Kir, regional police chief in eastern Croatia, continuously tried to halt small skirmishes between Serb militia and Croat police from developing into a civil war, all the while facing pressure from above in the form of the hawkish HDZ officials.

Aside from individuals, the portrayal of institutions and forces as agents in the descent to state collapse and war are superbly woven into the story. As mentioned, the contest between centrifugal and centripetal forces for power in the Yugoslav state began in earnest once Tito died; although under him they had precedent. The multi-member presidency effectively reified the implication that republics were now the keepers of their resident nations, with a couple of notable and dangerous exceptions to that logic. Economic decline and social strife fuelled this polarized debate – symbolized by the western republics of one side, and the eastern on the other, or richer versus the poorer states. However two institutions kept them together, the League of Communists and the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA). ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ was still the central plank to their worldview. Any violation to the sovereignty and territoriality of Yugoslavia was verboten. It was the former that was to go first.

At the seminal, and what was to be the final, conference of the League of Communists in January 1990 (I have covered this in a past blog piece), it was Kucan as head of the Slovene delegation that led the walkout that saw the end of the League of Communists.  The centripetal forces had won. The JNA on the other hand clung on, even after the loss of Slovenia and Croatia. However, by that time, its Serb contingent moved from working under the JNA banner in Croatia then Bosnia to local Serb units. The detail of the movements on the ground are vividly portrayed, with lines of communication – either between Croatian Police forces and the leadership in Zagreb, or the Serb militias and the ‘Yugoslav’ leadership in Belgrade – explained concisely.

Further on, the details of the war and sieges on the ground, and the pathetic response by world community, is despairing. Hindsight only makes you question why the EC and UN did not do more. Initially wanting to keep Yugoslavia intact, splits developed in the international community that led to different directions and approaches on how to stop conflict emerging. Within Yugoslavia, the tussle of whether 'self-determination' should be exclusive to the republics or the nations fed into the splits in the international community. The price paid was ethnic cleansing.


What gives this book its power is the knowledge garnered from the active participants. Although written in 1996, and with the participants possibly not giving a full and frank account, the authors weaved a compelling account from numerous actors and actions of institutions, to describe the events and processes that took hold of the former Yugoslavia from the early 1980s. How it slowly describes the ethnic untangling of peoples is a daunting prospect for us in communities that are ever becoming more multi cultural. However, the book doesn’t give, nor does it need to, an account of how to stop this. Instead this book is more a warning, a warning to those who seek political power by manipulating institutions, individuals and the masses, through tools of fear and hatred, in order to put into practice a narrow nationalist agenda. 

Monday, 24 March 2014

The ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian conflict of 2001 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The violent conflict that erupted within the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) can generally be described as one between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Slavic Macedonians during 2001. One source puts the death toll from 150 to 250, with at least 650 casualties on both sides. Added to this are the tens of thousands of civilians that fled their homes, with many yet to return; and at one point the Macedonian state lost control of up to 20% of its territory (J. Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans, 2004). This case study aims to elucidate the varying factors that contributed to the escalation of tensions, emanating from the growing distance between Albanians and Slavic Macedonians, which has occurred since FYROM’s independence in 1991. I will account for the contentious issues that have been highlighted by scholars as being central to this conflict, whilst developing a sense of each ethnic group’s identity. I will then analyse various accounts as to what motivated the escalation of the conflict towards violent actions. I will do so using theories of ethno-political conflicts that look to the impact of the transition from Communism, insecurity and political power struggles, as well as other possible theories. I will conclude by looking at how a resolution to the conflict came about and assess whether this has been a success.

The political context at the start of the conflict needs to be understood, as it was a political solution rather than a military one, which ended it. Heading the Government of the Republic of Macedonia was the right-wing, nationalist ‘Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity’ (VMRO-DPMNE) party led by Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski, in coalition with the ethnic Albanian Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) led by Arben Xhaferi. The President of the Republic was Boris Trajkovski also from VMRO-DPMNE. The main opposition was the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), also an ethnic Albanian party. The population of the country was over 2 million people and its ethnic composition was estimated as being between 64-66% Macedonian and 23-25% Albanian, the rest comprising other minority groups. The Albanians were concentrated in the western and northern parts of Macedonia. Specifically, the conflict was between the forces of the Macedonian state on one side, and the National Liberation Army, led by Ali Ahmeti, on the other. It came 10 years after the Republic’s independence, during which time an ethnic Slavic Macedonian party and an ethnic Albanian party were in some form of coalition. It also occurred 2 years after the international community’s attention was focused on the plight of Albanians in neighbouring Kosovo.

The first and long running political issue was of the position of the Albanians as a group in the Republic of Macedonia, which was expressed in terms of nationality and citizenship. During the formation of a new constitution, nationalist Macedonians wanted the new state to be a national state of the Macedonian people, whereas the moderate Macedonians and Albanians wanted a civil state for all its citizens. What emerged in the preamble was a compromise whereby the state belonged to the Macedonian people, with the Albanians being mentioned elsewhere as a ‘nationality’. Albanians viewed their status as a nationality, newly equating them to Vlachs and Roma, as a downgrade from the middle ranking they had in Socialist Yugoslavia’s allocation of peoples, nationalities and ethnic groups (J. Engstrom, Democratisation and the Prevention of Violent Conflict, 2009). The issue of citizenship inflamed the already tense situation. The November 1992 Law on Citizenship automatically made 90% of the inhabitants citizens of the state, however ‘the law also postulated that only those born in the republic and those who were ethnic Macedonians were considered Macedonian citizens.’ (V. Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict, 2002). Albanian demands were backed up by their own numerical claims, which went beyond the stated 25%, to 35 or 40% (Engstrom). From a Macedonian perspective, they would not compromise on giving the Albanians constitutive nation recognition as it could have compromised the territory of the state through secession (A. Ivanov, The Balkans divided, 1996). Also, ‘In ethnic Macedonians’ view, the ethnic Albanians’ numbers, their sharply demarcated national identity, and their vociferous political aspirations considerably outweigh the scope of rights conventionally accorded to national minorities.’ (H. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 2003).

The second issue was the provision of university education in Albanian. At a constitutional level, the Macedonians weren’t going to recognize Albanian as an official language (Ivanov). In education, they provided for a small faculty in the main University in Skopje so didn’t feel compelled to do more. Thus the University of Tetovo was founded in February 1995 upon the initiative of the Albanian community, but was shut down by the authorities, a sign of the familiar fear of Albanian secessionism by the Macedonians. (Phillips). At the same time, however, the university in Skopje was in need of reform and financial aid, so wasn’t given attention by the state either. This leads to other cultural factors, such as the right to raise the Albanian flag. The symbolism of not being able to raise the Albanian flag, as imprisonment was the punishment, fed into the wider discourse of Albanian discrimination by the Macedonian state. (Liotta & Jebb, Mapping Macedonia, 2004). Discrimination was also evident in the economic sector. Along with the disadvantages of not being able to further their education in their native language, Albanians couldn’t access employment in the public sector. By 2001 only 3.1% of the military and police force comprised of ethnic Albanians. (Phillips). This was apparent in the private sector too where an illegal economy was operating twinned with corruption involving the political establishment, and only served to underpin already held prejudices by the Macedonians of the Albanians. (Engstrom). Amongst the series of demands by the Albanians there was a distinct lack of calls for secession, even with the murmurs after independence a political solution was desired prior to the conflict in 2001. However ‘Feelings of insecurity and lingering threat perceptions also contributed to the Macedonian majority’s reluctance to respond favourably to Albanian demands for expanded rights in the areas of education, language and state employment.’ (Engstrom). In summary, the conflict between the two ethnic groups, brewing since independence, was displayed through political, economic, cultural and social struggles by both political elites and the masses, with each side taking a different perspective to the other.

But what factors aggravated the situation, to turn the dispute over these issues into a violent clash between the Macedonian authorities and the NLA? It is interesting at first to note that the demands that the NLA made, a couple of months after the violence began, were more or less the same as the Albanian politicians. But the NLA sought to reach those aims through violence and steadily won over the support of ordinary Albanians in Macedonia, yet still not aiming for a ‘Greater Albania’. (Roudometof). Support shifted to the NLA from the leaders of the ethnic Albanian DPA and PDP parties because Albanians were growing wary of promises not being fulfilled. This inertia in government fed into the Albanians perception that ‘their’ leaders were just cosmetic cover for Macedonians to present itself to the ‘International Community’. However, for the Macedonians, the violence just proved their point that Albanian demands shouldn’t be met. This links to issues of trust and insecurity that Macedonians had with their identity and the process of nation building, if one takes Victor Roudometof’s view that it is a construct. (Roudometof). So a dual process of protecting the state and protecting the nation went hand in hand, the former from external threats and the latter from internal ones. The response of the Macedonian state to the insurgency was the logical conclusion of this viewpoint. This feeds into Will Kymlicka’s argument (‘Multiculturalism and minority rights’, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues, Issue 4 2002) that Western minority rights ideas cannot be applied to Central Eastern Europe because it is ‘securitized’ by a fear of losing territory, hence the Macedonian rhetoric of Albanian secession. But Albanian claims of being victimized grew stronger.

Aside from these internal events, Kosovo had a crucial aggravating role. Macedonia bordered what was then still part of Serbian territory. Refugees came over the border for refuge during the crisis, and afterwards international KFOR forces were deployed to control the situation internally. The refugees affected Macedonians because of the demographic impact it would have on the states’ population, thus provided minimum help so they would eventually return. From the Albanian perspective it reminded them further of the need for reform as only small steps were being made. (Roudometof). Henryk Sokalski, the former head of UNPREDEP, who was stationed in Macedonia from 1995 to 1998, gave a sober assessment of the situation: ‘The absence of UNPREDEP […], KFOR’s exclusive concentration on Kosovo, and the inadequate resources of the Macedonian army created a haven for such activities and easy illegal cross border traffic.’ Although the Macedonian state wished to protect the state and nation, the opposite occurred.

The trigger for the ethnic conflict in 2001 was the reassigning of territory from Serbia/Kosovo to Macedonia, but confusion remains over who began the spiral of violence. The event centered on Tanusevci, home to predominantly Albanian families. One argument is that it was the failure to secure independence in Kosovo that saw the national liberation movement being exported to Macedonia. (Phillips). Another argument criticizes the Macedonian interpretation of events, that NATO failed to protect the border from Kosovo extremists and discounts the claim that the goal of the Albanians was unity and secession, by quoting the NLA’s aims from 5 March. (Roudometof). However they both agree that the town symbolized the start of the conflict. So ‘the ineffective response of the Macedonian security forces allowed this local difficulty to escalate, coupled with the Macedonian political rhetoric, which demonized the Albanian population, igniting the ethnic Albanians’ simmering resentment of perceived discrimination.’ (M. Laity, Preventing war in Macedonia, 2008). The media propagated a large part of this demonization for their ethnic Macedonian audience.

Economic considerations also became a factor and can be linked to the issue over the borders and security. The effects of moving from a command economy to a market one, the inability to get loans due to lack of international recognition, the 1993 UN sanctions on trade with Serbia, and the economic blockade by Greece that cut off export links to Thessaloniki in 1994 all contributed to difficult economic circumstances that affected the Albanians disproportionately. (Sokalski). Less protection on the borders with neighbouring states fuelled the illegal economy and black market trade and in turn took on an ethnic character. A final factor was the lack of a fully developed civil society to overcome the widening ethnic divisions in the country and to challenge the political elite on both sides. One scholar writing before the conflict noted that ‘The Republic of Macedonia may be said to be going through an endurance test, where multicultural civility must prevail over ethno-nationalist seizures.’ (J. Schwartz in Halpern & Kideckel, Neighbours at War, 2000).

The conflict continued to escalate violently and spread to other parts of northern and western Macedonia after the events in Tanusevci. Only dialogue or a military victory could resolve the situation. At the beginning the Macedonian state believed that a military solution was the only option, and the NLA obviously had no faith in the Albanian political leaders, so came to the same conclusion. But neither side could exact a military victory, nor were they willing to open up a dialogue. All the while, the two ethnic groups gravitated towards ‘their’ ethnic kin, accelerated by Macedonian rhetoric on the NLA (Liota & Jebb). A ‘Unity Government’ was formed by the 4 main ethnic political parties under the President, through NATO and EU intervention. A final deal involved liaison work between the two sides, which included handling local situations so that neither side lost face or could claim to have retreated in the context of the wider conflict being resolved. Again, media handling played a crucial role. (Laity). One should be mindful of Gareth Evans’ discussion (‘Ethnopolitical conflict’, Ethnopolitics, 10:1 2011) over the need to balance the right to intervene with state sovereignty, that preventative action has the most effect. Although invited, UNPREDEP was a success in that violent conflict was avoided during the 1990s. However, once it was gone it highlighted the essential need for third party help. The resulting Ohrid Framework Agreement set about to disarm the NLA, and provided for political and constitutional changes (Liotta & Jebb).

Although a political agreement ended the conflict, it was the nature of the political system that let down the two ethnic groups. The consociational model of democracy (Ljiphart, ‘Consociational Democracy, World Politics, 21:2 1969) that allowed Albanians and Macedonians to have a share in ruling the country prior to the conflict was the obstacle to fulfilling Albanian and Macedonian demands, and therefore had its limitations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement tried to devolve power for local majorities to govern more effectively. Another consequence is that the NLA leader is now a leader of the Democratic Union for Integration and in the government.

Any notion of ‘ancient hatreds’ doesn’t come close to explaining the violence in FYROM. In sum, Stuart Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory (Modern Hatreds, 2001) covers many of the factors that accounted for the escalation in the conflict. Elite rhetoric backed up by symbols linked to myths and fears provokes mass hostility to create a security dilemma. This is what occurred in Macedonia with the backdrop of all that came before it since independence. Eleven years after the conflict, events are started to turn once again, viewed through an ethnic prism (Balkan Insight reporting 2012).

Thursday, 6 March 2014

The former Yugoslavia and the descent into ethnic conflict


Many are familiar with the outcomes of the conflicts that consumed the republics of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s. Many thousands were killed, hundreds of thousands were displaced or made refugees, and homes, businesses and even entire towns were destroyed in the process. Yet attempting to establish a clear view of the origins of the conflicts from the present draws attention to the multitude of forces and factors that have been presented in an attempt to account for such origins. I will delve into some of the many theoretical perspectives that have been developed to understand how ethnic violence was capable in the now defunct state that took pride in its multiethnic character. One must first understand the nature of nationalism, as this is the touchstone idea that all theoretical perspectives on ethnic violence emanate from. I aim to avoid a chronology of the events, and instead I seek to provide a series of thematic debates around some of the contested views regarding the forces that contributed to ethnic violence. I will look to forces of a political, historical, social/psychological, and cultural nature and critically analyse their validity. I shall then pull together the views on certain fundamentals, such as whether the conflict was inevitable or premeditated and if it was elite or mass led, or a combination of both.

Ernest Gellner (Nations and Nationalism, 2006) defines nationalism as ‘primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.’ He goes on to say that sentiment is the feeling that is aroused when this principle is either achieved or violated, and that a nationalist movement is the sum of physical acts derived from such sentiments. Taken at face value, Socialist Yugoslavia could not be described as the realized goal of a nationalist given that numerous peoples, nationalities and ethnic groups lived within its borders. Nationalism as an all-pervasive ideology has been blamed for conflict, however, what is of more interest is how an ideology manifested itself and how it had to fit on to a culture for it to be adopted by its people, as Erwin Staub suggests (The Roots of Evil, 1989). Nationalism was not new to the region prior to the 1990’s, but neither was it as ferocious as what was later witnessed. The redefining of state boundaries in the early 1990’s along with the geographic placement of ethnic groups within them are viewed as the watershed moment for the conflict to have begun, and I will now turn to the first of several theoretical viewpoints that lead towards this point and the violence being ethnic in nature.

Rogers Brubaker (in Daedalus, Vol. 124, No. 2, Spring, 1995) provides a theory centred on the political dynamics surrounding the collapse of the Yugoslav state. His triadic nexus of national minorities, nationalizing states and external national homelands portrays a relational perspective to the Yugoslav break up between these three. Because of the ‘nationalization of political space’, since the bigger political space has now evaporated, those constituent nations now dwell in pockets in new states where another dominant nation now governs. Citizenship in one state is balanced with ethno-national affinity with another. So an individual is at the centre of the triadic relationship going on, and of two nationalisms being played out; one in the state they reside in, and one in the ‘home’ state. Conflicts arise because of new reconfigurations of the triadic nexus. Nationalizing states partake in the elite-led promotion of a homogenous nation in a heterogeneous society, where there is a large national minority who is organised yet politically alienated. This group makes demands based on real or perceived threats to their wellbeing, and are closely watched by elites in their ‘homeland’ who protest on their behalf for their rights. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be seen in this triadic form. Three overlapping processes consisted of nationalizing Croats both before and after independence, disaffection and nationalist mobilisation of Croatian Serbs in the borderlands, and the development of a belligerent homeland stance in the Serbian state leaning on a Serbian dominated JNA to create a Greater Serbia out of the federation. So the Croat secession wasn’t simply a response to Serb assertiveness within Yugoslavia, but a nationalizing process by Croats. The interplay between these three processes acted as catalysts for people to become involved because of their perception of and reaction to events in one of the other two processes. These were founded on representations that had to be developed from monitoring situations in the other fields, and packaged in a way for people to be mobilized. So although he believes the processes to be elite-led, they had to have support from the masses. He takes the view that after an event occurred; new perceptions or responses were triggered. So he looks at the contexts of an event in relation to what went before it that acted as a trigger. This created the conditions for an escalation of events, the catalyst being the political leaders. However he looks at the process of the break up in isolation from the processes that led to the break up.

Jack Snyder (From Voting to Violence, 2000) believes democratisation played a role in this. He believes that nationalism is weak prior to democratization, and that this process actually produces nations and nationalisms. When political leaders wish to garner support, yet not to relinquish too much power to the citizen, they provide for partial democracy using nationalism to gain it. The timing and context of democratization varies the nationalism that results. Exclusionary nationalism occurs if the country is poor, the citizens lack skills to participate in democracy, and when politicians, the media and institutions are weak during the beginning of the process. This is what occurred in Serbia and Croatia. In pre-conflict Yugoslavia democratization and political decentralization led to communist elites fearing for their position, giving them an incentive for leading popular nationalist movements. Decentralization and the ethnofederal nature of Yugoslavia allowed these elites to use the institutions at their disposal for this advancement. Four factors allowed for democratization to lead to nationalism and then ethnic conflict. First, he argues that ‘Historical legacies created the conditions from which conflict could emerge…’ Secondly, the structure of the federal system, tying ethnic groups to republics, was conceived in order to deal with the nationalities question but instead it created divisions within Yugoslavia, that not only nationalists favoured but liberals also, and became represented as a debate between Slovenia and Croatia on one side, and Serbia and the Army on the other. Thirdly, challenges with the economy were in tandem with the maneuverings of political elites to gain support on the onset of a more open political system. Finally, the media were an important factor in that the ethnic republic leaders could monopolize as much as they could. Journalists and intellectuals who disseminated nationalist myths aided this. But this only fed into prejudices that were already present therefore a supply and demand scenario existed. The only downside to this argument is that it doesn’t account for the rise of Franjo Tudjman as President. His portrayal can be seen to mirror Slobodan Milosevic’s conversion during democratization, but not of an anti-communist figure that rose independently of the state structures. He was more a figure of ‘Historical legacies’ if anything. However, Snyder does provide three more political factors that I will now approach. 

Marshal Tito’s policy of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ sought to erase the competing nationalist versions of World War II history by providing a narrative that united the new Yugoslavs around a Partisan myth versus internal and external fascist enemies. The new socialist Yugoslav constitution developed a system of republics, most of which had a nation tied to them. In addition to this there was the guarantee of equality of the nations throughout the republics, for those who do not live in their ‘home’ nation. And this is where Sabrina Ramet believes Tito went wrong. In her epilogue in Balkan Bebel she argues that when Tito opted to tolerate the already present cultures based on a thin ‘Yugoslavism’ anchored in the Partisan myth, instead of creating a new Yugoslav identity, he embedded the continual resurfacing of inter-group hatred from the World War II era. Therefore the trauma of those who experienced it never went away. Anthony Oberschall (in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp. 982-1001. November 2000) agrees with her focus on the Yugoslav constitution but for a different reason. He felt that because there was a balancing act going on to appease all the different ethnic and national stakeholders in the country, any attempts by nationalists to alter it would obviously focus on issues including the drawing of boundaries and placement of peoples. But he prescribes democratization as the antidote to nationalists employing ethnic cleavages. This is the opposite of what Snyder argues as he placed democratization first with the rise in nationalism as the consequence. I would agree with Oberschall that nationalists would try and alter the borders of the republics, but his approach is set within the context of a communist state where nationalist communists were the actors who could affect that change, and this wasn’t the case. Democratization led to the election of both a nationalist ‘communist’ in Slobodan Milosevic and an outright nationalist in Franjo Tudjman. Therefore the rules of the game changed. The borders issue became more prominent once Tudjman made the calls for secession because they would lead to international state boundaries, not internal republic borders. So the issue became a lot more contentious and therefore more open to conflict. Given that republics were tied to nations, this provided the ethnic paradigm. To add to this E. M. Despalatovic (in Halpern & Kideckel’s Neighbours at War, 2000) makes the point that when Croatia was gearing towards independence and after the HDZ had won the elections; they fired Serbian communists – not because they were Serbs but because they were communists. So the result of democratization was the removal of communists in the state bureaucracy yet presented as removal of the Serbs. This feeds into Brubaker’s argument about opportunities for political leaders to represent the other process, here the nationalization of the Croatian state. In terms of contributing to ethnic violence, economic issues pale into the background, but they do add to the factors that may have left the population frustrated and motivated to turn to nationalist politicians and be receptive of their messages.

But people were receiving messages from other sources, namely the media, as pointed out by Snyder. Bette Denich (in Halpern & Kideckel’s Neighbours at War, 2000) provides a compelling case on the lack of communication between the numerous elites and amongst the various ethnic populations. Denich’s argument is that there were two processes going on. First, Serb and Croatian nationalists were arguing over the overlapping nature of their claims for territory, which meant that they were only concerned with their own nationalist version of truth, and not listening to others. Second, this meant that the ordinary people weren’t listening to each other either, helped by the media’s portrayal of events. The narratives at play, victimization and threat, fed into those who weren’t ‘nationalist’ before. Only those not involved in an ethno-nationalist framework were distant from it, but they were few in number. In employing Benedict Anderson’s assertion that print capitalism played a part in the forming of commonality prior to nation-state formation, she points to mass media that was devolved to the republics, which carried narratives produced by the intelligentsia’s of the republics based on the raw materials of ethnic identity. The media in each republic therefore pushed different perspectives on the same news to different audiences who reacted differently. The portrayal of victimization by each media and of the ‘other’ as a threat, coupled with no actual response to the ‘other’ only their projection of them, led to an escalation of the perception of the ‘other’ as being a threat. Without other contrary viewpoints, these perceptions grew and became exaggerated. Therefore the media was employed as a tool to foster conditions on the ground that led to ethnic tensions being raised backed by each republics leaders and intelligentsia. To link with Brubaker’s triadic nexus argument, the communication of representations was key for the processes to interact with each other and produce different responses to events. So the media was complicit in fostering those conditions.

So what we had was a combination of political forces that interacted with each other, and played off each other, which fostered conditions for ethnic violence the former Yugoslavia. Established political elites sought to exploit the move to democracy for their attempts to cling on to, or reach, power in their home republics, using the existing structure of the Yugoslav state; and the ideology of nationalism as tool to garner mass support by communicating through republic owned media outlets. This led to the collapse of the League of Communists as an institution and the subsequent undermining of the Yugoslav state that had been created to unite the nations of the South Slavs. But solely pointing to political forces leaves out the emotional connection people at the grassroots level had and could relate to.

Historical forces are another viewpoint from which to understand the conditions that were created to lead to ethnic violence. Norman Naimark (Fires of Hatred, 2001) points to both the Serbs and Croats prior to the conflict exploiting their versions of recent ‘history’ in order to mobilize their respective ‘nations’. ‘The Serbs in Krajina mobilized around the threat of a new Jasenovac…’ and rested on past and present inflated numbers of Serb deaths there during the Ustasha state. Whereas the anti-communist Croats connected the Serbs to the communist legacy by pointing to Croat massacres under Tito at the end of World War II. These messages were relayed by the media, which was controlled by both Milosevic and Tudjman. These fed into repressed memories of those who lived through them times and were thus employed as a tool to mobilize them. He feels that the brutality displayed during the war in Croatia had ‘to do with the history of the region since 1940 and the urban social groups that fostered Serbian paramilitaries than it did with the inheritance of the distant past.’ His latter point regarding outsiders coming in to the area to stir up conflict, I will approach later. He does have a valid point about the present use of selected (and perhaps contested) historical facts to underpin nationalist rhetoric. But this argument doesn’t go far enough in the sense that there is a detachment between those who lived through the experiences of World War II and those who have grown up since; he doesn’t account for their mobilization. Aside from factors that have been mentioned up to now that could have motivated this group of people, Victor Roudometof (Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy, 2001) argues that it is necessary to take into account the educational mechanisms responsible for the production and proliferation of stereotypes. ‘As the different nationalist agendas of the Balkan nation-states gradually became enshrined in regional historical discourse, they inevitably found their way into songs, schoolbooks, and local traditions.’ Thus collective memories were acted out daily and were barriers to solving the problems of the 1990’s. Because there was no outlet to answer the ‘national question’ under communism, the 1980’s saw a revival of historical revisionism. In the 1990’s, history was ‘renationalized’ and used as a tool for ethnocentric propaganda. There are two links here; the first being Sabrina Ramet who said that communism didn’t provide a vehicle to openly discuss the traumas of World War II. But Rogers Brubaker better links the past to the present in his triadic view of the Serbs ‘as active participants in the intensifying conflict and as political subjects in their own right, construing (and misconstruing) the dangers of the present in the light of the atrocities of the past.’ This linking of the past to the present leads on to ethnosymbolism and cultural forces in general.

Stuart Kaufman (Modern Hatreds, 2001) argues from a ‘symbolic politics’ perspective on the cause of ethnic war. He believes that two roots to ethnic violence are mass-led or elite-led. Developments of three factors are crucial to reach this end, mass hostility, ethnic outflanking by political elites, and a security dilemma. By mass hostility he refers to an external affinity problem (i.e. a group is a majority in the state, but a minority in the region), a history of ethnic domination, or issues over ethnic symbols. A security dilemma can occur when these threaten other groups, and when outbidding by extremist leaders in power up the ante on this because of a perception of extinction on either side. So he believes that ‘If the necessary conditions for ethnic war are myths, fears, and opportunity, the timing of the war is explained by an increase in fear, opportunity, or hostility justified by the myths.’ This could be down to a rise in symbolic events or where a political opportunity presents itself, which determines whether it is elite or mass-led. Conversely, a lack of ethnic symbolism can be seen in areas where ethnic violence didn’t occur but had mixed ethnicities. His judgement is that relevantly modern hatreds, found in renewed accounts of myths and stories, inspired the killing in the former Yugoslavia, which links into the arguments set out by Ramet, Roudometof and Naimark. Events in Yugoslavia were elite-led, albeit with ethnic hostility already being present amongst the masses, which ramped up the low level hostility through fears manipulated by symbols and myths. Roudometof agrees with the power of symbols, myths and stories that were used as mobilizing tools, and he places a time on when their true potential was realized. After the independence of Croatia ‘the new ethnic symbolisms emphasized the explicit ethnic character of the proposed new state.’

Although Ramet agrees with Kaufman on the traumas of World War II being relived and that Milosevic was tapping into already present hostility because ‘He catered to them, manipulated them, and amplified them.’ She fundamentally believes that because these people were culturally diverse they weren’t going to get on. So a chasm opens up here between the idea that it was the fault of political leaders who utilized symbols and myths of the past to conjure up ethnic hatred and violence in a once stable society, to a fundamental questioning of the reason why these people were ever placed in one state. The fact that different cultures were put together in the first place almost justifies Ramets’ argument that Milosevic (and others) had a simple task to achieve their aims, and this is where I disagree with her assertion of inevitability. It had to be linked to other ongoing processes at the time or else these groups would have been in conflict before the 1990’s, and this is where Kaufman’s argument stands up to scrutiny.

However, other social or psychological factors played a role in the path to ethnic violence. The first tranche of these focus on predetermined characteristics that could account for ethnic violence. Remembering Snyder’s point that nationalism was weak prior to democratization, I return to Oberschall whose approach to ethnic violence leans on two cognitive perspectives that Yugoslavs were meant to have had when conducting relations with other ethnicities. ‘People possessed both frames in their minds: In peacetimes the crisis frame was dormant, and in crisis and war the normal frame was suppressed. Both frames were anchored in private and family experiences.’ He points to the Tito-era as a time when the normal frame was activated, but he links the events of World War II and the 1990’s as one of repetition. He draws on personal history as a force for the actions of the present, and ties this to psychological factors inherent in the people of the former Yugoslavia. But to understand his theory he places it into the context of the 1990’s conflict and uses it to answer the question of why a people who lived harmoniously for forty years began to kill each other. The crisis frame was triggered by elite manipulation in the context of a security dilemma, so here he links to Kaufman’s theory. Benjamin Valentino (Final Solutions, 2004) narrows this notion of some form of individual cognitive frame, experienced by a collectivity. His approach to the cause of ethnic violence goes back to the argument of it being elite-led. However, he believes that instead of the masses participating in a wide spread melee, the violence was conducted by a small group of people with the rest of the population as bystanders. Because only a few people are perpetrators they are selected, and can be fanatics or those manipulated by elites in certain situations. He divides perpetrators into two types, ones who are innately biased towards violence and others who are ‘ordinary’ yet are seduced into it. So psychological factors and social/situational ones motivate perpetrators to violent acts. Preexisting ideological convictions or hatred alone did not account for violence, nor can the severe brutality of some can be seen as generic to all perpetrators. Yet soldiers carry out violence as duties from the top of the hierarchy. His argument then is that all humans have the capacity to kill but it is individuals who make a choice on what they wish to do. This latter argument tied into the idea that something needs to occur for humans to kill, such as a situation or coercion, seems to be plausible, yet does run closely parallel to Oberschall’s cognitive frame idea that is somewhat rigid.

Looking at it from a different tangent, H. Grandits and C. Promitzer (in Halpern & Kideckel’s Neighbours at War, 2000) point to a historically rooted patriarchal mentality that descended from the Military Frontier, where Catholics and Orthodox were united as soldiers. These remained up to the time of the 1990’s conflict, including the predisposition to use force and take up arms. This went in tandem with the use of symbols to act as triggers to draw out different responses by reactivating historical values. This may have some weight if it can be based less on psychological/biological foundations and more on its penetration into local rituals and customs of communities. But to tie up the debate on predetermined societal and psychological forces that led to ethnic violence, I return to E. Staub, whom I quoted earlier arguing that nationalism had to fit the already present cultures for it to succeed. His wider argument is that that ‘Certain characteristics of a culture and the structure of a society, combined with great difficulties or hardships of life and social disorganisation, are the starting point for genocide or mass killing.’ He believes that most cultures possess characteristics that have the potential for group violence and that certain circumstances that they find themselves in unleash it. This underlines Grandits and Promitzer’s argument if taken from my suggested perspective. All these theories point to the circumstances of the period in the early 1990s as the trigger for all these preordained factors to become active, so there must be validity in their claims. However, I can only agree with those claims that are rooted in a sense of cultural continuity such as Staub, and Valentino to a degree, because the triggers for the violent acts need to have a human or emotional connection for these presumptions to be valid. Staub’s example of ‘life problems’ is one such link. Another could be the lived experience of World War II.

Yet Staub also provides us with a temporally linear explanation that leads to ethnic violence, as opposed to a purely predetermined one, this being the ‘continuum of destruction’. His idea here is that small destructive actions that become more routinely used can justify the next destructive action, and so on. This idea assumes the collective nature of the actions, whether they be societal or between ethnic groups. The start of such a process can be as long as the observer or researcher wishes it to be. A primordialist of an ‘ancient hatred’ tradition would see this stretch back millennia. But more modern arguments place it within the last two centuries. Brubaker’s argument regarding the impact of education places it in the 19th century. Roudometof’s theory of collective memory places it in the wake of the atrocities in World War II, if not before that. But what is of key importance here is that hatred had been building up over a period of time. This can explain two things. First the role of the bystander, and second the reason why mass killing didn’t occur straight away.

On the former point, Valentino argues that mass killings don’t need mass support, just indifference for it to occur. It is wrong to assume that the masses support it. Mass killings don’t just start from scratch, but the public show negative support by allowing legal measures and social attitudes to build up discrimination and hatred of vulnerable social groups. So no one opposes it. Accordingly they may support the regime but not the killing. But even if they do, he says it may be down to propaganda and mis-information to ‘cover up’ the extent of it. ‘Throughout the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Belgrade sought to cover up its atrocities or characterize them as legitimate military actions.’ So this backs up his argument that ethnic violence is elite-led, and links to Staub’s ‘continuum of destruction’. On the latter point, the former argument backs up the common sense idea that mass killing didn’t just spontaneously erupt, but that the conditions had been building up and brewing for sometime. Yet, this still doesn’t explain how it did arrive at violence. Although the war was a conflict between Croatia and Yugoslavia backed up by the JNA, something altered to make it an ethnic conflict on the ground in multiethnic communities. Here we can place the idea of the role of ‘outsiders’ in fomenting trouble and stirring up ethnic violence. Sabrina Ramet describes the events between the JNA intervening in Croatia and the amassing of paramilitaries to fight in the war. Clashes between Croatian militia and Serb irregulars highlight the potential for rogue elements to act out; however, they would not without either insecurity underpinned by nationalist rhetoric or from official orders. The latter is most likely. Yet a result of these clashes was that Serb paramilitaries formed and struck at towns in Croatia. So one can see how non-official combatants brought the conflict in to the region. Or as Grandits and Promitzer see it ‘the influence of movements outside the region developed national consciousness in the area.’

Taking into account the many forces that these scholars have attributed to the creation of conditions for ethnic violence, I seek to tie up two ideas. The first is the question of whether the ethnic violence was elite or mass-led. Many if not most of the theories point to an element of elite-led participation. Some argue that it may be as basic as a leader using the raw material of hostility, such as Ramet. Others developed a more nuanced argument that included the use of the media, state institutions, the circumstances of democratization and state collapse, along with the tapping into the already held prejudices of the population via ethnosymbolism. But one must concede that without the masses divided into two or more distinct groups (whether historically or newly fashioned) then there would have been no conflict over the placement of these people. Further to that, the build up over years, if not decades, of hostility had to have been incubated at the community level for the political rhetoric to resonate. So a combination of the two approaches is an adequate answer, but this links to the second question of whether ethnic violence was inevitable or a consequence of the series of events that came before it. This depends on the perspective of time one takes when looking at the events that took place through linear time. On one side you have Ramet who argues that Tito’s failure to solve the nationalities issue at he start of the second Yugoslavia meant it was inevitable to led to ethnic violence. However, her approach comfortably sits at the ‘end of time’ with the benefit of hindsight. Others take the view, such as Roudometof, that the build up over time of hostility couldn’t have inevitably led to violence given that they lived peacefully for forty years prior to the events in the 1990’s. Therefore, one must place the actions of the past, in motion, into the context of the time period just prior to ethnic violence occurring. And this is where Brubaker and Snyder’s views become useful. This is also where intent can be ascribed, according to some of the theorists mentioned, because of the elite-led nature of the violence.

In conclusion, the forces that led to the creation of conditions for ethnic violence to occur in the former Yugoslavia were varied, and fluctuated in importance according to the theory developed. I understand the situation as follows. Hostility was already present on the ground in the communities of the former Yugoslavia, and had been building up over time, thanks in part to educational institutions and the nurturing of cultural traditions. ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ was Tito’s policy to ensure that the nationalities’ issue was dealt with after the traumatic experiences of World War II, which were seen as ‘ethnic’ in nature. Through developments in the constitutional make up of the Yugoslav state, the republics grew as power bases for a small elites to govern, especially in regards to the media. With the onset of democratization, nationalists or reforming communist leaders sought to gain (or keep) political office. Nationalism was utilized by these leaders, using the boundaries of the republics for their new state, and communicating effective ethnosymbolic messages to the masses through the media, which resonated with some due to their lived experiences in World War II. For others, the socio-economic conditions, deteriorating since the mid-1980’s, mobilized their sense of isolation in a state that was collapsing. A continuum of destruction developed and became truncated in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, as nation-building reified distinctions of who ‘us’ and ‘them’ were, especially volatile in areas of mixed ethnicities such as eastern Croatia. A security dilemma took hold once ‘outsiders’ who used violence elsewhere in the region came into local communities coercing people to choose sides. For fear of death, those of the same ethnicity as the belligerents chose to take their side or become neutral bystanders to the violence. Therefore although one can point to the forces from history for ethnic violence, one must account for the activities of those who led the charge of utilizing such rhetoric that didn’t stop violence escalating, even actively promoting its use, in the period immediately prior to violence being committed. Ultimately, though, the participation of the masses, actively or passively, meant that the actions of the leaders could be easily justified, as they had no mass popular opposition to contend with.